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Joel Ivan Gonzalez Cedillo 
  
The Role of Wahhabism in Profiling of Islam in Russia 
  
Abstract. This dissertation addresses the topic of how predominantly non-Muslim 
population of Russia manages to peacefully co-exist with its highly integrated Muslim 
minority in the aftermath of the war in Chechnya and in the international environment of 
the Global War on Terror. It attempts to answer the question of Wahhabism as a major 
role in profiling Islam in Russia through research into Russian discourse on Wahhabism 
that bounds dialogue between non-Muslim majority and Muslim minority in Russia. This 
research is conducted through a methodology that includes qualitative content analysis of 
discourses from five different approaches, the analysis of reports by Russian media 
containing speeches and declarations that mention Wahhabism have provided most 
important part of primary data for this research. The study is centred around Wahhabism 
as a sign within a wider context of Russian debate on freedom of conscience and its limits. 
It finds that securitization - a concept developed within the so-called Copenhagen school 
of international studies - is applicable to a study of Russian discourse on Wahhabism.  
  
The study concludes that there are at least two narratives within Russian discourse 
on Wahhabism. Both narratives have the tendency to securitize Wahhabism, though in 
different ways. First, it is the narrative which tends to securitize Wahhabism as part of 
Islam. Participants to that narrative tend to treat Wahhabism as a proof that the conflict 
between predominantly non-Muslim majority and highly integrated Muslim minority in 
Russia is intensifying, with Wahhabism being at the spear point of the conflict. Second is 
the narrative which treats Wahhabism as another radical sect rather than a sect within 
Islam, the former narrative can be considered extreme while the latter mainstream. 
Participants to that mainstream narrative tend to treat Wahhabism as a proof of the threat 
that radical sects pose to people of all faiths, equally to non-Muslim majority in Russia 
and Russian Muslims themselves. 
  
Keywords: Chechnya, Discourse, Extremism, Islam, Profiling, Securitization, 
Wahhabism 
 
Хоел Иван Гонсалес Седилло 
Роль ваххабизма в восприятии ислама в России  
Аннотация. Эта диссертация посвящена тому, как преимущественно 
немусульманскому населению России удается мирно сосуществовать с его 
высокоинтегрированным мусульманским меньшинством после войн в Чечне и в 
международной обстановке «Глобальной войны с террором». Диссертация 
пытается ответить на вопрос ваххабизма с его важной ролью в профилировании 
ислама в России посредством исследования российского дискурса по ваххабизму, 
который ограничивается диалогом между немусульманским большинством и 
мусульманским меньшинством в России. Это исследование проводится с 
использованием методологии, которая включает в себя качественный контент-
анализ дискурсов пяти различных подходов  и анализ отчетов российских СМИ, 
содержащих речи и декларации с упоминанием ваххабизма, которые предоставили 
наиболее важную часть первичных данных для этого исследования. Исследование 
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сосредоточено вокруг ваххабизма как знакового явления в более широком 
контексте российской дискуссии о свободе совести и ее ограничениях. 
Исследование считает, что секьюритизация - концепция, разработанная в так 
называемой Копенгагенской школе международных исследований - применима к 
изучению российского дискурса по ваххабизму.  
В исследовании делается вывод о том, что в российском дискурсе по 
ваххабизму есть как минимум две точки зрения. Обе имеют тенденцию к 
секьюритизации ваххабизма, хотя и по-разному. Сторонники первой точки зрения 
стремятся секьюритизировать ваххабизм как часть ислама. Они склонны 
рассматривать ваххабизм как доказательство того, что конфликт между 
преимущественно немусульманским большинством и высокоинтегрированным 
мусульманским меньшинством в России усиливается, причем ваххабизм находится 
в центре конфликта. Вторая точка зрения рассматривает ваххабизм как еще одну 
радикальную секту, но эта секта не является частью ислама. Первый взгляд на  
ваххабизм можно считать экстремальным, в то время как второй является 
мейнстримом. Те, кто придерживаются этого «мейнстрима», склонны 
рассматривать ваххабизм как доказательство той  угрозы, которую радикальные 
секты представляют и для немусульманского большинства в России и самим 
мусульманам России. 
  
Ключевые слова: Ваххабизм, Возприятия,  Дискурс, Ислам, Секьюритизация, 
Чечня, Экстремизм 
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INTRODUCTION 
More frequent discussions are taking place in the Western European and 
American societies on what freedom of speech should protect and what should be 
censored by the State to avoid conflicts of dominant groups promoting supremacy over 
sexual, gender and ethnic minorities.  This situation has particularly aggravated in the 
U.S. where liberal groups who enjoyed access to the decision-making circles of the White 
House from 2009 to 2017 managed to turn the roles to their favor and create the conditions 
for the conservative discourse that used to repress them, take their position as new 
dominated. This brought great advances on social inclusion of minorities and sectors of 
the population who used to be powerless, like women. Nevertheless, as it evolved, and 
was taken to the extreme by far-left groups that voiced for censoring all conservative 
discourse, a conservative countermovement of those who were tired of what they called 
"political correctness" started growing. As the so-called political correctness, this 
countermovement was not new, and neither an isolated phenomenon unique to the U.S., 
where one of its major drivers was the possibility to speak up publicly against 
propositions of the government, like immigration and multiculturalism. This took force 
in the summer of 2015 when thousands of people fleeing conflict zones in the Middle 
East and Africa made it to European shores in look for refugee status and worsened with 
the terrorist attacks in Paris in November that year. This conservative countermovement 
brought back old stereotypes on Middle Eastern people and Muslims through discourse, 
as the men responsible of the attacks shared these characteristics, and was well-received 
in the U.S. and Western Europe reviving the idea of a clash of civilizations between 
Christian based societies and Islam.  
With a consolidated conservative administration in the U.S. that won the 
presidential election of 2016 using a discourse that its followers considered against the 
politically correct, and that did not pay too much attention in drawing a clear line between 
Wahhabi (referred also as extremist Islamists) groups that take part in international 
terrorism and Muslims, attacks against this segment of the population became more 
frequent. This situation was also seen in England, France and the Netherlands with key 
elections where conservative nationalist parties used a similar formula and target 
population. Though the political success of these conservative movements is rather 
questionable, these societies have to ask themselves what will be consequences of 
profiling all Muslims as dangerous and possible terrorists in the making through their 
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discourse. Here a theory of extremization through discourse that can try to explain this 
can be introduced, as when in a functional society that goes through a traumatizing event 
or series of events capable of creating the conditions for a discourse that blames a specific 
group (powerless), the threat of extremization emerges as members of the blamed group 
(powerless) are pushed out of society through discourse and enter the process of searching 
a new identity. They may find themselves attracted to extreme ideas they perceive can 
counterbalance the discourse that first expelled them as well as provide them with shelter. 
The process is not linear as individuals do not go from being functional members of the 
society to extremists in a straight line, they must go through a process that includes 
rejection and acceptation and can last their entire lives. They can choose to continue this 
search endlessly until they are either taken back by the society, decide to embrace 
extremism or live in exile from the society (we see this with diasporas).  
In terrorism and counter-terrorism studies exist pull and push factors of 
radicalization accepted by the academia. Among them, the work of E. Bakker analyzed 
in this research, gives little attention to the role discourse may play in the extremization 
of individuals. Discourse more than just the means to make available an extremist 
message should be considered a factor as it can target emotions in the search of a reaction, 
and with more frequent terrorist attacks in Western Europe and the U.S. and more young 
men joining extremist groups, the urgency of this topic can be exposed by asking 
ourselves if we are creating extremists through our discourse. Extremization of 
individuals is not a phenomenon unique to the West but also one that Russia experiences. 
The importance of this research lies in two levels, the first one at the national level which 
can help understand what is Wahhabism and how it developed in the Russian context, its 
relationship with international terrorism and who is fighting against it. Among this, it can 
also help re-educate non-Muslim Russians on their accepted socially constructed 
perception that all Muslims are or can be extremist Islamists who pose a danger to the 
society, and with this eventually eliminate discrimination and prejudice. At the 
international level it helps understand both, the Muslim and non-Muslim Russian society 
through history but also why some legal instruments in Russia need to exist. This is 
crucial to ameliorate the perception the Russian government and its actions have in 
countries like Mexico, where some sectors of the population are extremely critical on 
decisions taken on the outlaw of religious organizations considered extremists like 
Jehovah Witnesses without appropriate knowledge of the ongoing fight against 
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extremism of all types in the country, the legal framework and its origin.  This research 
can also give a better understanding on the composition of the Russian Federation for 
students and academics who may have been exposed to a more Western conception of 
Russia as the representative of an Orthodox Christian group of countries populated 
entirely by ethnic Russians, ignoring the Federal composition of the state and the 
existence of all other ethnic and religious groups, though it is predominantly cultural 
Orthodox Christian. A different approach to understanding why the participation of 
Russia in the conflicts in the Middle East is more welcomed than that of Western countries 
is given too, highlighting the struggle against international terrorism and extremist 
Islamist groups, like Syria and Russia fighting the Islamic State. 
On the other hand, the relevance of this research lies in identifying the connection 
between discourse and profiling, focusing on Islam and Muslims in the Russian context 
due to the lack of material on this and the area of opportunity it represents. Identifying 
this relation should be of high importance for the Russian government to create a more 
complete strategy in the fight against international terrorism and extremism, as if we 
identify there is a connection between discourse on Wahhabism and profiling of Muslims 
as extremists, we could prevent extremization of individuals by moderating discourse. 
This analysis can also provide new information for researches from the West specializing 
in security studies and who could see in the Russian model, an example of the attempts 
to moderate extremist discourse, parting from the assumption that a moderate discourse 
on Islam and Muslims has prevented individuals from being pushed out the society and 
get extremized, this in combination with a military strategy, intelligence work and social 
regeneration.  
Since the introduction of extremist Islamism or Wahhabism in the Northern 
Caucasus during the first Chechen war, it underwent a process of acceptation and 
rejection as knowledge on it increased. It was not possible to find references on what was 
the perception of Islam among non-Muslim Russians before 1992, though this period is 
out of the timeframe this analysis was conducted, we can make some assumptions based 
on the information that was gathered on the relation between Islam and the Soviet Union 
in chapter II that mentions a constant drawing of legal lines the Soviet government would 
change every once in a while, tightening or loosening control on Muslim communities. 
Muslims and non-Muslims have co-existed in what is part of the contemporary Russian 
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territory since the tenth century,1 Muslim majority countries became part of the Soviet 
Union and currently, they are neighbors of the Federation and a source of migrant 
workers. Adding to this, the promotion of the friendship of the peoples’ ideology where 
all nations were to unite under the international socialist, which included the Northern 
Caucasus and was open for other states in the Middle East and Central Asia. It would be 
interesting to know if the military conflict in Afghanistan against the mujahedeen was a 
starter or had any influence on the Soviet people’s perception of Muslims as dangerous 
or the enemy, or were they not seen as Muslims but as rebels fighting an ally as in many 
other states in the world that chose the Soviet model over the American one. Anyhow, 
this conflict though lasting, was not geographically close to the core of the Soviet Union 
where more non-Muslim Russians who still identified as Soviet rather than Orthodox 
Christians lived, and so did not have the same capacity of shaping perception on Muslims 
like the situation in Chechnya did. It is worth to mention the other almost synchronized 
military conflicts in the decade of the 90’s that Muslims in the Gulf War where a U.S. led 
coalition fought Iraq and the Yugoslav Wars where the Muslim factor was present with 
Bosniaks fighting Serbs and Croats.  
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, more exposure to external events, 
and the new search for an identity, non-Muslim Russians may have fallen for the 
discourse that depicted Muslims as problematic or the enemy, that later was brought to 
reality with the terrorist attacks in New York in 2001 and the next year in Moscow 
committed by followers of Wahhabism. This is where the hypothesis for this research 
emerges, stating that because of the previously mentioned traumatizing events carried out 
by Wahhabis, all Muslims could be profiled as extremists through discourse, 
understanding Wahhabism is an ideology that promotes extremist Islamism. The aim of 
this research is to identify if Wahhabism has had any role in profiling of Islam in the 
country, answering the research question: do different sectors of the Russian society 
consider Wahhabism and Islam are an equal concept that is related to international 
terrorism?, this will be done through a methodology that includes a qualitative content 
analysis of discourses on Wahhabism from five different approaches (political, academic, 
nationalist, Muslim and Orthodox Christian) that are considered relevant in shaping 
perception among the Russian people, trying to find if there are any correlations between 
                                                          
1 Hunter, Shireen T. Islam in Russia. The Historical Background. Islam in Russia. The Politics of Identity and 
Security. The Center for Strategic and International Studies. M.E. Sharpe. Armonk, New York. P. 3 
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this extremist Islamist ideology and traditional Islam. Mass media was not considered for 
this research since it is not an actor capable of producing discourse by itself but rather the 
means to spread it. The objectives of this research are to give a historical review of the 
events that started in 1979 with the involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and 
how it relates to the future events in the Northern Caucasus and these, to the terrorist 
activities committed by Wahhabis. Also, to demonstrate the existence of the current legal 
framework that delimitates freedom of speech obey the necessity to maintain co-existence 
with mutual respect in a complex multinational and multi-confessional state. And finally, 
to set the basis for future research on how discourse can be a driving force to 
extremization of individuals. 
Structure of thesis. Since perception and profiling are both products of discourse, 
the first chapter of this research will be dedicated to explaining and understanding what 
this concept means. This analysis focuses on the those at the top of the social structure, if 
it is seen in a vertical spectrum where power and resources play the most important role 
in spreading a message. This analysis does not include the study of those on the bottom 
of the social structure as their capacity to create reality for others on specific topics 
through discourse is limited by their power and resources. Nevertheless, this research sets 
the basis for further analysis that focuses on the perception of the general population with 
no access to influence the masses through the discursive practice. Following the lines the 
liberal movement and the so-called political correctness delimit, the proposition of being 
careful with our words go far beyond being polite but involve the post-structuralist idea 
that claims our words create our reality. The term political correctness then becomes 
obsolete, as it can be considered a tool conservatives use to discredit a responsible 
discourse that seeks to create a non-hostile environment through the appropriate use of 
words. This approach will be analyzed in chapter I through a social constructivist 
theoretical approach to discourse, supporting the proposition that our reality is shaped not 
only by our words but also actions and omissions, and this becomes more relevant when 
those on the top of the social structure are the ones with more capabilities to shape our 
reality. The information gathered for this chapter was based on different literature found 
in search engines and books. The central part of this work focuses on discourse and the 
discursive practice, terms that are very frequent throughout the chapters, being loyal to 
the post-structuralist approach to discourse, everything we say and do as well as what 
omit can be considered discourse and this includes narrative and rhetoric. These two terms 
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though applicable, can be very limiting to understand and explain discourses given by 
actors as, their speeches and writings are not only about how they tell a story, the words 
they use or their public speaking skills (not all discourses analyzed are public speeches) 
but it rather involves moments, when the discourses were given as speeches or written as 
articles, to the time the events occurred and the intention they had to communicate a 
message.  
Chapter II will cover a historical analysis of the events previously mentioned in a 
time frame starting from 1978 in Afghanistan to 2017 in contemporary Chechnya, the 
information was retrieved from literature found in elibrary.ru and some books on the 
history of Russia and Islam. The republic of Tatarstan with a considerable Muslim 
population and its own identity and language, also went through a separatist movement 
in the 90’s with a referendum for sovereignty that 61.4% of the voters voted in favor2 to 
secede from Russia. Nevertheless, since this case was not as dramatic as those in the 
republics of the Northern Caucasus in regard to the level of military operations carried 
out by the Russian army and the separatists, as well as Wahhabis from Tatarstan 
committing terrorist attacks of great magnitude outside of Tatarstan. There have been 
considerable attacks by Wahhabis in Tatarstan against muftis and leaders of traditional 
Islam3, and because of this, discourse analysis of Tatar religious leaders is included in 
chapter IV. Chapter III starts with the discourse analysis of the non-religious groups with 
access to spreading their discourse to the population through different means, politicians, 
academics and nationalist groups and individuals. In the case of politicians this includes 
sources as public speeches, interviews for news channels, online newspapers, 
parliamentary addresses in the State Duma and meetings with regional leaders. Academic 
discourse are limited to the literature analysis of articles retrieved from elibrary.com by 
Russian academics and nationalist discourse corresponds to the literature analyzed in 
one book by a non-fiction author and a source of the website of a group that promotes 
Rusizm. Finally, chapter IV analyses the religious discourse on Wahhabism, highlighting 
the importance for Russian Muslims to define Wahhabism and distance themselves from 
it, as well as the hard work invested in fighting this extremist Islamist ideology. Orthodox 
Christian discourse is also included in this chapter but due to the lack of information 
                                                          
2 Edwards, Maxim, Gabidullin, I. Remembering referendums: Tatarstan and Crimea. 20 April 2014 // Aljazeera. 
URL: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/remembering-referendums-tatarst-
201441791739224343.html (date of retrieval 15.05.2017) 
3 In a First, Muslim leaders attacked in Tatarstan. 15 May 2017 // The Moscow Times. URL: 
http://themoscowtimes.com/news/in-a-first-muslim-leaders-attacked-in-tatarstan-16385 (date of retrieval 15.05.2017) 
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available, there are no major characteristics of this discourse that could be exalted. For 
both of these approaches, information was gathered from literature like articles, and 
sources like websites of religious organizations, and online newspapers. Additionally, 
official documents like the Russian constitution, laws and legal codes were used 
throughout the chapters.  
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CHAPTER 1. DISCOURSE AND ITS RELATION TO PROFILING 
A social constructivist approach to discourse with a content analysis as 
methodology is used in this work, giving special attention to some authors, like Louise 
Phillips and Marianne Jorgensen who in their book “Discourse Analysis: Theory and 
Methods” provide a crucial approach to the understanding of discourse, as well as Teun 
Van Dijk for his extensive work on the field. After the events of the 1990’s in the Russian 
region of the Northern Caucasus, much information became available on Islam and 
Wahhabism, possibly drawing a thin line in the minds of the receptors who knew little or 
nothing about Islam creating a dangerous association of both. With the years, more 
knowledge available and a consolidated government strategy to fight international 
terrorism, today, those in charge of spreading official information try to make it clear that 
in Russia, the enemy is not Islam.  
This chapter will be divided in two sections, the first one will be a theoretical 
approach covering the description of discourse and critical discourse analysis, as well as 
the implementation of it on speeches, declarations and interviews given by politicians, 
religious leaders and academics. The second part will be an analysis of the influence 
discourse has in Russian domestic and foreign policies through the study of some official 
documents that will demonstrate the authorities' position on targeting radicalism of all 
kinds. In this section, the concept of profiling will be described since, being part of the 
process of evaluating or identifying the “other” to identify ourselves4, is shaped by 
discourse and hence, critical to this research. Sufficient academic evidence of how 
discourse does have a weigh on the perception of the other and its profiling will be 
provided to demonstrate this relation. In domestic cases, this discourse transforms into 
actions that benefit or affect the communities and in regard to foreign policy, it can dictate 
how the Russian Federation conducts its bilateral or multilateral relations with other 
states.  
1.1 Discourse and Power  
There is an extensive multidisciplinary scholarship on discourse that has provided 
many definitions, among which is that of Van Dijk who describes discourse as “data that 
                                                          
4 McLeod, Saul. 2008. Social Identity Theory. Simply Psychology. URL: www.simplypsychology.org (date of 
retrieval 05.01.2017) 
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is liable for empiric analysis”5 which has the constructivist advantage of not limiting 
discourse to only text for example, but it includes everything else like pictures, speeches, 
advertisements and other forms of communication. Fairclough’s definition states that 
discourse is “…the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part”6 from 
which we see that he also includes text, and leaves room for other components. For 
Blommaert and Blucaen “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially 
conditioned”, and “an opaque power object in modern societies”7, this definition fits the 
nature of discourse from a constructivist approach as it is the society that gives value to 
the elements and situations those with power will use to shape it depending on the 
perceived needs of their dominated. Here it is necessary to highlight the importance of 
discourse in the exercise of power of the State that may come in a variety of forms. The 
State will not have to regulate or outlaw something if it has created the necessary 
conditions through discourse that make the society accept or reject specific attitudes or 
behaviors within itself.  
Habermas describes discourse as "a special kind of communication, a specific 
dialog which goal is an impartial analysis of reality, purified from the researcher's 
subjectivism"8. Tolpygina analyses the definition by Sheigan that states "discourse is a 
system of communication in the field of communication practices, examined in real and 
potential aspects", in which she describes the real dimension as the "actual speech 
activity" and the potential dimension is the “text resulting from it” that can be represented 
in a variety of symbols9. Tolpygina´s approach is important as she identifies how the 
speech activity can provide as many as possible interpretations and shape reality and 
recognizes communication as a crucial part of it. 
Finally, Phillips and Jorgensen define discourse as “a special way of 
communication and understanding of the world around us (or any aspect of the world)”10, 
this definition is the most appropriate and complete for this work since it includes all the 
                                                          
5 Quoted in Horváth, Juraj. Critical Discourse Analysis of Obama’s Political Discourse // International Conference of 
Language, Literature and Culture in a Changing Transatlantic (2009): 45. Univerzitná knižnica Prešovskej university. 
6 Ibid. p. 45 
7 Blommaert, Jan, Chris Blucaen. Critical Discourse Analysis // Annual Review of Anthropology. Annual Reviews. 
Vol. 29 (2000). P. 447. JSTORE. Web. 3. Jan. 2017. 
8 Quoted in Tolpina, Olga. A. Discourse and Discourse Analysis in Political Science // Political Science. 202. No 3. P 
76 (Толпыгина, Ольга А. Дискурс И Дискурс-Анализ В Политической Науке // Политическая наука. 2002. № 
3. С. 76) 
9 Ibid. p. 78 
10 Phillips, Louise, Jorgensen, Marianne. Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. Trans. From English. 2nd 
edition. SAGE publications, 2002. P. 18. (Филпс, Луиза, Марианна Йоргенсен. Дискурс Анализ. Теория И 
Метод/ Пер. С англ. – 2э изд., испр. – С.: Изд – во”Гуманитарный Центр”,2008. C. 18)  
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elements provided by other scholars, like communication, and introduces new ones like 
understanding. Things do not have a meaning until we give them a name, for us to 
understand our surroundings we have to understand the meaning of what is around us. 
Through understanding we can create knowledge, understanding that comes from 
discourse11 and that through social interaction, proves what is correct and what is wrong12 
and from there, our knowledge evolves and helps create a new discourse, that contributes 
to shape a new reality around us. This is a circular process in which it is crucial to 
understand that the world around us is not static and it can be changed according to 
people´s understanding and knowledge of it. 
 
 
 
 
Phillips and Jorgensen’s definition does not limit itself to name a specific type of 
communication as texts or pictures, but includes them all and recognizes them as part of 
the discursive practice. As seen in the figure above, in the circular process of shaping 
reality through discourse, social legitimization occurs twice, first when understanding is 
transformed into knowledge in which, historical and cultural factors affect the resulting 
knowledge. The second intervention occurs when the resulting knowledge is put under 
examination in social interaction when the society decides what is right and what is 
wrong13. There is a need of a second legitimization since, different societies can 
understand objects differently that, does not mean one is wrong and the other is right, 
their understanding is conditioned by their unique characteristics. On the other hand, to 
legitimize knowledge, it must be proven right or wrong through a careful methodology 
that can include empiric or scientific evidence.  
All the definitions presented before have some aspects in common like analysis 
of data in form of text or speech, social interaction, the reality around that gives shape to 
it, and power that emanates from the social activity. When it comes to defining power, 
we find scholars who claim that this is a broad concept that will depend from what field 
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12 Ibid. p. 25 
13 Ibid. p. 25 
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the researcher is using it and a variety of factors like the comparison we intend to make 
among actors in different situations that will help us understand power instead of defining 
it14. Dahl provides two relevant aspects for trying to define power: 1) it is a relation among 
people and 2) the means available to exercise power over the others15. In this approach, 
there is a relation between power and discourse as an object of power, since both 
discourse and power are a social phenomenon that results from interaction of people and 
at the same time, discourse can be a means of getting power.  
1.1.1 Control and Access 
Van Dijk identifies control as part of the exercise of power, meaning to either 
"limit the others' actions of influence their minds"16. From his approach, we can identify 
two types of exercising power: 1) elementary or what we can call outdated, that involves 
the use of direct repressive force or violence, and 2) modern that in his words, it "is mostly 
cognitive, and enacted by persuasion, dissimulation or manipulation...to change the mind 
of others in one's own interests"17. Karnaushenko´s definition of power is more useful as 
defines it as “the right and opportunity of some to command, control and manage others, 
the skills and abilities of some to exercise their will in relation to the others, to have a 
decisive influence on their behaviour and activities, using their authority, law, violence 
and other means”18. In Karnaushenko’s definition “other means” can signify cognitive 
means like those Van Dijk proposes. Hence, power is about control and influence those 
without it, using the means the powerholders have access to.  
Access is an important element of discourse in the relation between power and 
dominance19. Those on the top of the society usually have access to more resources of all 
types, in the case of discourse, it is more accessible for them to get their message spread 
through media and legitimized by official institutions created by the system itself, which 
in the same time, is constructed by the dominated. In his analysis of power and dominance 
and the lack of access for the dominated, Van Dijk’s proposition can be complemented 
with a more contemporary reality in which those who he refers to as “ordinary people”20, 
                                                          
14 Dahl, R. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Science, 2:3 (1957: July) P.203  
15 Ibid. P. 203 
16 Van Dijk, T. Principles of critical Discourse analysis // Discourse & Society. University of Amsterdam. P. 254  
17 Ibid. P. 254 
18 Karnaushenko, Leonid V. “Political Power” and “State Power”: to the Question of the Correlation of concepts and 
the semantic content of definitions // Philosophy of Law. 2008. No 1. P. 23. (Карнаушенко, Леонид В. 
«Политическая Власть» И «Государственная Власть»: К Вопросу О Соотносимости Понятий И Смысловом 
Наполнении Дефиниций // Философия права. 2008. № 1. С. 23) 
19 Van Dijk. p. 255  
20 Ibid. p. 255 
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today have created and opened other resources to spread their message reaching out to 
the same or an even bigger audience the elites or establishment (the powerholders) do.  
Additionally, language is an element of access because it is the basis of 
communication and in modern societies and the recently new available means to spread 
our discourse, like social media and internet platforms, the reach our message can have 
depends not only on the availability of our means in other regions but also on the 
possibility of our message to be transmitted or receive other discourse in a different 
language as well as the information we have access to. Not only language helps have 
access to a specific “market” but also to better understand the sentiments of the nation it 
is addressed to. The researcher can always translate a news release or the speech given 
by President Putin in certain conference but if the researcher has no knowledge of the 
conditions around it that helped create it, the information will be limited to articulated 
words in a speech. In this case, Russian language can be the “door” to understanding what 
Russians think or perceive of terrorism that took the authorities take a specific position 
and write the speech the President addressed to the nation. It can also help the researcher 
investigate what the people’s feelings and thoughts on that speech are, by talking directly 
to them, gathering information from social media or interviewing Russian experts.  
We have started a new era of discursive struggle for power where what once were 
thought as official sources of information legitimized by the institutions through the lack 
of access for criticism by the dominated and their condition in the bottom of the power 
structure, today lose their constructed identity. Now, the voices of the dominated can be 
heard since the almost unlimited access they have got to influence or control other 
people´s minds, has given them power21. This represents an unprecedented win for those 
in the bottom, having the possibility to question the official discourse of those on the top 
of the power structure. This poses a danger too, since all types of discourses that once 
were relegated to one-on-one opinion sharing or small room meetings that include 
misinformed or radical and fanatical points of view resonate hand to hand with the official 
discourse, are faster to reach out to the audience and sometimes more attractive. 
To understand the role of the dominated we have to understand they are only a 
part of the society. We can group society into three categories: 1) the dominated, 2) the 
outsiders and, 3) the opposition. The first are those who are under control of the 
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powerholders or dominant, willingly or unwillingly. Once the dominated realize they are 
under control and decide to stop listening to the discourse that first put them in that group, 
they become outsiders. The role of the outsiders should be to expose the dominants’ 
intentions with the use of unbiased scientific data to counter balance their actions and the 
effects on the dominated without involving in the struggle for power. If the outsiders 
decide to take power from the dominant, they become the opposition and will try by all 
means to diminish the dominants’ reach on the dominated and increase theirs to become 
the new dominant.  
The new voices of the dominated or opposition, deconstructed reality and created 
a new one through discourse. Arguably, it is inaccurate to say the new dominant are equal 
in power to the elites or establishment that would have control of the dominated, this 
would be an unfair comparison as the new dominant may have power to influence an 
audience but not to make direct changes in the decision-making process. It is the 
dominated, who follow the new dominant´s discourse, the ones capable of changing the 
decision-making process in their systems. The case of Maksim Martsinkevich better 
known as “Tesak”, three times trialed under the article 282 UK. RF. for inciting ethnic 
hatred can help understand this. He is a quite popular figure in social media groups in 
Russia that promote neo-Nazism, racism, Islamophobia and homophobia. Though 
Martsinkevich was part of the People´s National Party (NNP) that promotes “rusizm” and 
a political ultra-right policy for Russia22, his criminal actions were committed after he 
arguably left the organization in 2003. With different profiles under his name in social 
media, and many groups along the country that advertise his project “Occupy Pedophilia” 
and carry on the same violent activities, his followers account for over 200,000 in 
Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kiev23. This case shows how the access we have today to 
spread our discourse can easily reach out to every corner of the country, defying and 
revealing against the official discourse of unity of the Russian Federation. This individual 
did not have access to change the decision-making in the country yet he opened himself 
other resources to gain power on others who still today and after more than two years of 
his current prison time, are influenced by his words24. I consider today, the conditions for 
                                                          
22 New National Way (Новый Национальный Путь) URL: www.nnpr.su (date of retrieval 17.04.2017) 
23 Kiev was included for two reasons, the idea of “rusizm” is based on a Russian identity, with its historical origin in 
Kievan Rus so this might be accepted by Martsinkevich´s followers and some members of the group he led in St. 
Petersburg and Moscow fled to Kiev after his imprisonment like his partner and second in charge, Ekaterina 
Zigunova to avoid State persecution.  
24 Martsinkevich published a book called Restrukt of nationalist content in which he tells about his time in prison, the 
reasons of it and the projects he started, Format 18 and Occupy Pedophilia.  
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these groups´ actions to have an effect on policy makers do not exist but their discourse 
is already out there and ready to be heard in any moment the social and political conditions 
allow it to resurge. At the end, Martsinkevich took an aspect of his surrounding, 
homosexuality, interpreted it and created an alternative knowledge with his hypothesis of 
homosexuals are equal to pedophiles that used in his discourse and evolved into an 
accepted reality among his followers. 
1.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
After defining discourse comes the necessity to evaluate how we can understand 
this process of communication, hence discourse analysis is the tool that we can use to 
achieve this. Discourse analysis refers to the study of how language is used in the 
discursive practice. In social sciences, where the struggle for power is determinant in 
social relations to control and influence the actions of the dominated, indoctrination in 
the shape of messages and images can be hidden in the discursive practice in a way they 
cannot be perceived by the dominated, keeping them in that condition. Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) can help breakdown the message, set it free for the audience and 
eventually change their situation as dominated25. Van Dijk defines CDA as “a type of 
discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the 
social and political context.”26, definition that supports Horváth’s pronouncement. 
Because of its “critical” nature, CDA can be considered as a useful tool, the opposition 
can take advantage of when is looking for a change in the status quo in certain society. 
CDA as a tool is incredibly powerful, that we see today how some governments in the so-
called “Free World” that traditionally voiced for freedom of speech, are attempting to 
limit or control the access the dominated have, to spreading their critical voices. This has 
two reasons, 1) a response to an irresponsible use of CDA tools and 2) a genuine fear of 
losing control.  
The first reason, can be explained through the analysis of how the dominated have 
got almost unlimited access to information from a variety of sources, often questionable, 
that for the uneducated can lead to suppositions with dangerous consequences for 
understanding and the creation of knowledge that, following the circular process of 
                                                          
25 Horváth, P. 46 
26 Van Dijk, T. A. Critical Discourse Analysis // The Handbook of Discourse Analysis/ edited by Deborah Schiffrin, 
Deborah Tannen, and Heidi Hamilton. Blackwell Publishers. 2001 P. 352 
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shaping reality (subchapter 1.1), social legitimization in its second filter can mislead to 
the acceptance of a distorted discourse. We can deepen the concept of “irresponsible 
CDA” with the following example, country A, in which the current administration is in 
favor of a multinational identity that includes all ethnoreligious groups and the president´s 
official discourse show the benefits with facts and data. CDA is a tool that can be used 
not only by academics but also by journalists, think tanks, and professional and amateur 
analysts, but the last play a bigger role here so, case 1 appears. Those who oppose the 
presidential discourse favorable to multinationalism, will use CDA to decompose the 
official discourse and create alternative facts to spread their ideology, this is irresponsible 
CDA. The authorities in country A have two options to address this: a) to shut down the 
access the opposition has, to spreading their ideology through the use of force (see 
subchapter 1.1.1) and b) educate the society with critical thinking skills to identify real 
from alternative facts. Option “b” is interesting because, country A has a third option, c) 
to exercise its control on the entire society and convert them into “dominated” through 
cognitive means, like mentioned by Van Dijk27 but this is too costly and could revert and 
turn that part of the society that are not dominated by country A, into part of the opposition 
when they find out. Hence, option “b” is the best for country A to keep a balance between 
the opposition, the dominated and the outsiders with critical thinking skills that could 
criticize country A´s actions but also, help fact check the opposition CDA, filter their 
message and weaken it before it reaches the dominated. In terms of time-effectiveness, 
option “a” is faster but can rebuke back and accuse country A of censorship, leaning the 
outsiders to the opposition. The second reason or the fear of losing control, has more to 
do with losing legitimacy as being questioned or criticized can make the constructed 
authorities wobble. For this, we have country B, where exercise of power has exceeded 
every aspect of the lives of the dominated, the outsiders and the opposition. The last two 
groups start to organize, together or separated, and spread their message through the 
accessible platforms in an attempt to reach out to the dominated. For country B to exist, 
the dominated have to keep this status and therefore, the outsiders´ and the opposition´s 
access to discourse has to be limited or controlled.  
Going back to CDA as an analytical research method to highlight how rhetoric 
and syntaxy are key in creating the power relation between the powerholders and the 
dominated, as mentioned by Van Dijk in many of his works, we can see the example of 
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Russian presidential discourse and Islam, considering the figure of the president as the 
perceived highest authority in the country, there are not elements in the syntaxy and 
rhetoric that entirely relate Islam to terrorism, but this will be analyzed deeply in chapter 
III. With this said, the dominated who accept the president's power, accept his discourse 
and are influenced by his words on this topic. On the other hand, we have the president 
of the United States who for this example, will be considered a counter part of the 
president of the Russian Federation because of the historical relation between the two 
States and his discourse on terrorism and Islam. The president of the United States has 
openly and continuously related both terrorism and Islam and accused all Muslims of 
being part of it either by committing these acts or not pronouncing themselves against 
them.28 The dominated of the American president who attend his discourse are genuinely 
influenced by his words, rhetoric and ideology that their attitude towards Muslims is of 
confrontation and rejection. Here we have two different discourses, with their own 
characteristics that include context, history, culture and understanding and in the result, 
both create their own knowledge and reality on the same issue. This is an exciting 
comparative analysis of Russian and American discourse on terrorism and Islam that 
because it is not part of this research, will not be covered deeper.  
1.2.1 Ideology and Propaganda 
As discourse constructs and is constructed by reality, shaped by the conditions and 
context around, it helps those who have the power and access in certain society, spread 
their knowledge and understanding of reality to those who accept their domain. This 
knowledge and understanding, as shown in figure 1 (subchapter 1.1), depends on a variety 
of filters affected by conditions those who create and spread their discourse live in or 
experience. This could result in a special understanding and knowledge of reality around 
or ideology. Ideology can be defined as “the meaning in the service of power”29 that, 
according to Althusser works in two ways: 1) repressive state organs (police, military) 
and 2) ideological state apparatus (mass media)30. These two coincide with Van Dijk’s 
elementary and modern elements of control analyzed in subchapter 1.1.1. Stress will be 
made on the modern element that is equal to Althusser’s proposed way of ideological 
                                                          
28 Hawkins, Derek. Trump’s talk — ‘Muslim ban,’ ‘Islam hates us’ — comes back to bite him in court again. 
16.03.2016 // The Washington Post. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/03/16/trumps-talk-muslim-ban-islam-hates-us-comes-back-to-bite-him-in-court-
again/?tid=sm_fb&utm_term=.7fd0ac0219d3 (date of retrieval 16.05.2017) 
29 Phillips, L., Jorgensen, M. P. 131 
30 Ibid. p. 40 
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state apparatus. Both use cognitive means to control the dominated and even, drag some 
outsiders under the dominant’s umbrella. But how can the dominant spread their ideology 
successfully using the power they have, to influence the thoughts or actions of their 
dominated? Rodero has provided an interesting analysis of propaganda used by Adolf 
Hitler in the 1930’s that can help answer this question31. She defines propaganda as the 
“systematic and reiterated action, exercised by oral, written or iconic means, on public 
opinion, with a persuasive purpose, mainly through suggestion and similar psychological 
techniques to infuse any ideology/doctrine…”32. From this we understand that 
propaganda targets emotions through messages with little or no data at all, it is aimed at 
getting a rapid reaction with a simplistic message.  
Rodero mentions that propaganda cannot work if the emotions it targets are 
nonexistent in the dominated, “propaganda is sustained in the emotional charge, it appeals 
to feelings creating a genuine emotional pressure” and,” Hitler did not get Germany to 
become an anti-Semite nation, because the seed was already, to certain degree, 
implanted”33. Propaganda works better on the dominated because they are already willing 
to accept the discourse those they perceive as authorities, give. In this context, and for 
mere illustrative intentions, through an empirical qualitative analysis of anti-Muslim and 
anti-Islam sentiments in Russian social media and search engines, we can find numerous 
derogative pictures and messages that show the ethnocentric principle of “us vs. them”, 
constant in supremacist discourses. Nevertheless, this exercise is not conclusive to say 
this is a feeling shared by a non-Muslim majority in Russia and therefore, will need 
further and more specialized research. On the other hand, this online discourse can be 
considered propaganda if analyzed through Rodeo’s definition, but since this anti-Islam 
propaganda does not match the position of the government or the perceived authorities 
by the dominated, it hardly finds a public space. Those who attend this propaganda, are 
on the opposite extreme of the government position that should one day the administration 
change, with a new president for example who supports nationalism, this discourse may 
be a good tool to exploit. 
1.3 Influence of discourse in Russian domestic and foreign policies.  
                                                          
31 Rodero, Emma. Concept and techniques of propaganda and its application to Nazism // Acts of the III International 
Congress on Culture and Mass Media. Pontificia University Publications. Salamanca, 2000. P. 3 (Concepto y técnicas 
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To sum up the previous subchapters, discourse can be defined as the way we 
conceive our surrounding and consciously or unconsciously transmit to others, it is 
constructed and not static, it involves elements like control and access in the search for 
power with the use of cognitive means like propaganda to spread an ideology or message. 
Every person, nation and State have their own interests, reflected in the discourse practice. 
Sometimes they are easy to spot in the political discourse when the President uses phrases 
like “it is the best for our nation”, “the people of (x nation) have decided”, or even clearer 
“it is in the interest of our nation”. Sometimes these interests are more carefully hidden 
by the political actors involved, in an attempt to avoid direct and open confrontation, like 
NATO joint military exercises in Poland, from where we understand that for Poland’s 
interests, it is crucial to count on NATO military and show its readiness and willingness 
to respond to a perceived Russian aggression. Another example of this is Hungary’s Prime 
Minister Viktor Orban discourse on refugees, Islam and European Christian roots34. In 
his discourse on refugees coming from the Middle East to the European Union after the 
Syrian Civil War of 2012, he often includes historic references to Hungary´s role in the 
contention of the Ottoman advance into the heart of the then, Christian European 
kingdoms. His discourse is also plagued with ethnocentric elements that reflect his 
position of “us vs them” evidencing his interest in influencing Hungarians and possibly 
other people of the European Union who identify as Christians, by going straight to the 
emotions with a message like Christians stopped the Muslim invaders before, Christians 
must stop them again. The reasons behind Orban’s discourse could be many, and we must 
consider his interests not only as protecting Hungary from “Muslim invaders” but also, 
political interests like positioning his party in elections or getting a new political seat in 
the future. With these two examples, we see how interests draw the line our discourse 
will follow, whether they are evident or hidden in it. But how is the interest – discourse 
relation expressed in the Russian government context? And can a critical discourse 
analysis reveal the position of the Russian authorities towards Islam and their interests in 
creating or maintaining relations with the authorities of Muslim majority countries?  
1.3.1 The role of discourse in the national context of the Russian Federation  
                                                          
34 Noack, Rick. Muslim threaten Europe’s Christian identity, Hungary’s leader says. September 3, 2015 // The 
Washington Post. URL: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/03/muslims-threaten-
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The Russian Federation like any other State, has very specific interest at all levels, 
highlighting guaranteeing national security as one of the top priorities. President Putin 
has expressed the government’s will to cooperate in the fight against international 
terrorism but this should not be seen only as a gesture of kindness to the West, affected 
more and more by this phenomenon but rather as part of a wider strategy of national 
security. If we understand the historical and geopolitical conditions of the Federation, 
specially paying attention to the 90’s and the conflicts in Chechnya, we will find that 
international terrorism represents a real threat for national security as foreign fighters 
from countries like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia joined and provided economic 
resources to the Chechen separatist movement. 
It is also possible to identify the interest – discourse relation of Russia on Islam 
and the Muslim population if we look at the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 
1993. Though it is not explicit, article 3 is clear to show that for the Russian authorities, 
all ethnoreligious groups, including Muslims, are an important part of the nation: “the 
bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation is its 
multinational people”35 this is also evidenced in article 29 paragraph 2, “…It is forbidden 
the propaganda of social, racial, national, religious and language supremacy”36. With the 
two previous examples, we see how the multinational and multi-confessional nature of 
Russia is acknowledge by the federal authorities. But there is no clearer example of the 
commitment of the federal government to fight ethnoreligious hatred than article 282 UK:  
Actions aimed at the incitement of hatred or enmity, as well as the humiliation 
of a person or group of persons on grounds of sex, race, nationality, language, 
origin, attitude towards religion, and likewise affiliation to any social group, 
committed publicly or with the use of mass media or information and 
telecommunication networks, including the network "Internet", -shall be 
punished by a fine of three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand rubles 
or the salary or other income for a period of two to three years, or community 
service for a period of one year to four years, with disqualification to hold 
certain positions or engage in certain activities up to three years, or 
imprisonment for a term of two to five years.37 
                                                          
35 Article 3, Constitution of the Russian Federation  
36 Article 29, paragraph 3. Constitution of the Russian Federation. 
37 Article 282 UK RF, Criminal Code, N. 63-F3. (ст 282 УК РФ, Уголовный кодекс, N 63-ФЗ) 
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The position of the authorities on the multi-confessional and multinational 
composition of the State is evidenced as a top interest and priority, we can merge both 
concepts into one, culture, as it includes religious and national aspects. The protection 
and growth of culture as well as the traditional Russian spiritual and moral values are part 
of the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation of 201538. The general 
provision no. 79 of the Strategy of National Security states the following:  
 The threats to national security in the field of culture, is the blurring of 
traditional Russian spiritual and moral values and the weakening of the unity 
of the multinational people of the Russian Federation by foreign cultural and 
informational expansion (including the spread of low quality products of 
popular culture), propaganda of permissiveness, violence, racial, national and 
religious intolerance…39 
This general provision proves one more time that, a key component of the Russian 
Federation is its multinational and multi-confessional people, after all, the country is not 
only made up of ethnic Russians or Orthodox Christians, though they are a majority in 
general, the Constitution protects all groups and recognizes their rights to the practice of 
their traditions and the Strategy for National Security even promotes the spread of other 
groups traditions, who are part of the Russian Federation. Analyzing these two official 
documents is crucial for understanding the role discourse has in the national affairs and 
that from here, other type of discourse is created based on the interests framed. Because 
of this, it is extremely difficult to find public discourse by politicians, academics or 
religious leaders promoting or expressing disdain against Islam or its followers. This does 
not mean this type of discourse does not exist, it just is not given access to the higher 
channels of spread of information, but this will be analyzed in chapter III.    
To sum up and answer the question of how is the interest – discourse relation 
expressed in the Russian government context, it would be accurate to say through the 
official documents like the Constitution of the Russian Federation, as well as the 
constitutions of other subjects of the Federation and other documents like the Strategy of 
National Security of 2015, analyzed here for its relevance in stating the interests of the 
                                                          
38 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation. Approved by Presidential Decree RF of December 31, 2015. 
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government. Other laws are also important as they are all the result of discourse and the 
understanding the people of the Russian Federation have of their surroundings and agree 
with, as they commit to follow these laws. But discourse is not only limited to the written 
laws and the government can use other means to spread its interest of maintaining the 
social stability of multinationalism and multi-confessionalism like the media and use of 
soft-power.    
1.3.2 The role of discourse on Islam in the international context of the Russian 
Federation 2001 - 2017 
Foreign policy is a reflex of national policy and as such, the discourse that is 
followed by Russia abroad should be a mirror of the one at home. With a population of 
over 16,000,000 Muslims40, Russia is the European state with the largest followers of 
Islam and home to one of the largest Mosques41 in the continent. In comparison to other 
European states, Russia has an older relation with Islam due to political and geographical 
factors that have contributed to the integration of Muslims into the Russian society42. 
Though, discourse against this integration does exist, it is not part of the authorities’ 
position and has limited access to the masses, part of this can be thanks to the measures 
the State takes like article 282 UK to fight hate speech and intolerance. 16,000,000 
Muslims may seem like a huge number capable of influencing decision-making on 
Russian foreign policy in the Middle East for example, where there are other Muslim 
majority countries with even smaller numbers than that of Russia. Nevertheless, the 
reaction of this sector of the population is probably considered when taking decisions, 
especially military. After the NATO and US – led coalition “Operation Iraqi Freedom” 
incursion in Iraq in 200343, we witnessed how homegrown terrorism increased and even 
caused fatalities in England and Spain44, as a response to the discourse (acts) of these 
governments and that of radical Islamic leaders (speech) that promoted jihadism, in and 
outside Europe.   
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Russia is also a major key player in the fight against international terrorism, and 
even cooperated with governments like that of the United States in situations like 9/1145 
and more recently the Boston marathon bombings46. With more than 5 years of the Syrian 
Civil War, and the announcement of the Russian military operations in support of 
President Assad in late 2015, the Russian government sent a clearer message of joining 
the fight against international terrorism more actively. This decision could have also come 
as the means to prevent the activities of the so called Islamic State spread in the Northern 
Caucasus where still a few members of the group “Caucasus Emirate” operate. It is critical 
to remember that the Russian government has already fought and suffered the 
consequences of international terrorism in the decade of 1990 when Wahhabi followers 
and jihadi militias poured into Chechnya from regions like Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia 
to combat what they perceived as the “Russian enemy” and protect other Muslims. This 
is the reason why Russia has to demonstrate a tough position against jihadism, violent 
Islamic extremism and international terrorism but at the same time, keep a clear line 
between these problems and the Muslim population that follows their religious principles 
and values and agrees to comply with the laws, as any other confessional or ethnic group 
in the country, even cooperating in fighting non-traditional interpretations of Islam, like 
Wahhabism, in the Northern Caucasus and other parts of the country.  
Wahhabism is the interpretation of Islam officially encouraged in Saudi Arabia 
and as will be analyzed in the following chapter, it keeps very close ties with the Saudi 
leaders. The modern Russian – Saudi relations extend to a variety of fields like economic 
and academic, and dates to the 1990’s47 and today includes negotiations on oil prices, 
weapons and a resolution to the conflict in Syria. This bilateral relation is too extensive 
to be described in this research hence, attention will be given to the discussion on the 
ideological principles supported by Saudi authorities that put this country at odds with 
Russia. With public beheadings and lashes as punishment for infringement of the law, 
Sharia courts in Saudi Arabia are a reminder of a distant reality in Chechnya when 
Wahhabi militias managed to establish similar courts. Some analysts have gone as far as 
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comparing Saudi Arabia with the so called Islamic State for their literal interpretation of 
the Qur’an and hence, an extreme view of the religion. The Russian discourse towards 
the so called Islamic State is strong and blunt, leaving aside the geopolitical reasons it is 
the ideological values that are dangerous for the stability of the Northern Caucasus. These 
ideological values are similar to those of Saudi Arabia, and the Russian discourse here 
should be seen as more moderate as there are more variables at play like oil and gas prices, 
weapons and cultural, having Russian Muslims going to the annual pilgrimage in Mecca. 
Last, the heads of government of the Republics in the Northern Caucasus play their part 
in fighting a discourse that promotes a violent radical Islamic ideology, this will be 
analyzed in chapter IV. This subchapter analyzed how Russian discourse on Islam in the 
international context is affected by inner situations regarding the Muslim population and 
has been constant over the last sixteen years fighting international terrorism abroad, that 
includes jihadism, and at home with defensive and preventing measures.  
1.4 Profiling 
After analyzing the role of discourse in shaping our reality, the link between 
discourse and profiling should be clear. As explored in this chapter, our understanding of 
the surroundings becomes words that eventually will be part of a discourse we accept or 
reject. Our surroundings include an array of elements, among them, people. The way we 
perceive or understand people, is key in the way we interact with them. This 
understanding is also affected by the type of discourse other members of the group we 
identify with have of those who are not part of our group. To define profiling, first it is 
necessary to refer to the social identity theory and the mental processes that help create 
the “us” vs “them” system.  
Henry Tajfel’s social identity theory main proposition is about “a person’s sense 
of who they are based on their group membership(s)”48 and there are three elements in 
the process of evaluating others that makes easier for us to relate to them and understand 
what we should expect from them. These elements are: social categorization, 
identification and comparison49. Social categorization occurs when we categorize people 
as we do with objects, for example nationalities or religions like Russian, Chechen, 
Dagestani, Christian, Muslim. This process is not only imposed on others but we impose 
it on ourselves too, if subject A identifies as Russian, then he or she will act as such, 
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adopting what is considered Russian traditions, customs, expressions and will look to be 
around other Russians. The previous is part of the second process or identification. These 
processes reinforce the idea of identity by Laklo and Muff who propose people acquire 
treatment through discourse depending on their subjective position50. They also describe 
how the subject can be fragmented into different positions51, say subject A does not only 
identifies as Russian woman, but also as a mother when she is at home with her family 
and as a colleague at work. The last stage of comparison occurs when we have categorized 
people and given specific qualities that we consider better describe them for the group we 
have put them into, we compare our group to the others’. This process has advantages and 
disadvantages, if we voluntarily put ourselves into one group for the things we share and 
the identity we believe we have, this will contribute to the formation of groups that 
preserve their own language or traditions, for example, immigrant diasporas in Russia. 
On the other hand, if we are put into a group by the discourse of others because of the 
things we do not share and in the process of identification, these differences are enlarged 
by those who put us in it (the dominant), creating stereotypes that can be harmful for the 
relation between both groups as these could serve in the discourse of the dominant to 
increase its self- esteem by pointing out these differences as negative.  
Profiling can be described as “a technique whereby a set of characteristics of a 
particular class of person is inferred from past experience, and data-holdings are then 
searched for individuals with a close fit to that set of characteristics”52 This technique can 
be equal to the mental process of evaluating others mentioned before, nevertheless, this 
technique should be considered outdated if we see it from a constructivist discourse and 
deconstruct the accepted reality based on stereotyping that can be wrong. An example 
could help better illustrate this, after the years that followed the second war between 
Russia and Chechnya, some violent acts were committed in Russian cities by supporters 
of jihad and a separate Islamic government in Grozny. In that time, it could have seemed 
logic for the authorities to profile all of those who fit the known physical characteristics 
of jihadists, like garments or facial hair. Nevertheless, we can refer to the events in 
Volgograd in 2013 where ethnic Russians took part in planning or committing terrorist 
acts53, who did not fit the accepted profile of jihadists. This might not be a representative 
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number but it does show that the strategy of profiling individuals based on their physical 
appearance does not always match with the constructed ideas of how a jihadist should 
look and is even dangerous since the authorities might be failing to identify actual 
jihadists who manage to mingle within the authorities’ group.  
Chapter II will provide a historical approach to the relation between followers of 
Islam and Russians 1978 to 2017 with special attention to the conflicts that erupted 
between both sides. The wars between Russia and Chechnya in the 90’s and the 
continuous fighting against separatists once the legitimate government was established, 
could have contributed to construction of a perception that all Chechens and therefore, 
Muslims or other nationalities from the Northern Caucasus are to be feared, since some 
of those separatist groups promoted their acts waving jihad and in their own interpretation 
of Islam or Wahhabism. This and other perceptions are constructed through discourse, 
intentionally or unintentionally, in this case separatist Wahhabi followers who promoted 
jihad and international terrorism against the Russian government and then the legitimate 
Chechen government, could be responsible for this perception. The result of this, could 
be the profiling of Islam and its followers in Russia, based on the information that was 
passed on the dominated through discourse in the time of the armed conflict, the aftermath 
and more recent days.  
Unfortunately, international terrorism has increased in the European Union, the 
Middle East and the United States since the outbreak of the armed conflict in Syria and 
the proclamation of the so-called Islamic State, whose followers adhere to a similar 
discourse remnants of separatist militias in the Northern Caucasus do. This contributes to 
the reinforcement of profiling and a negative perception of all followers of Islam in non-
Muslim regions, even having some authorities endorsing a speech of intolerance based 
on fear and wrong information. There is not sufficient academic evidence to prove that 
profiling individuals leads to extremization but this approach should be explored deeper 
and how it can undermine trust between different groups especially when the profiler and 
the profiled always belong to opposite ends that are or have been in conflict. 
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CHAPTER 2. HISTORY OF WAHHABISM IN RUSSIA 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late XX c. left not only the problem of 
finding a new economic model for the republics that constituted it but an array of others 
like building a new political project and its legitimization as well as constructing a new 
national identity that was previously transformed by the Soviet one. It was in this process 
of finding a new identity that some nations clashed with what elements were to be 
considered as being Chechen, Estonian, Russian, Tatar, etc., that conflicts have their 
roots. This part of my research will cover a historical approach to the proposed issue that 
starts in 1978 with the armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and goes 
up to 2017 that explores the current conditions in the Northern Caucasus. The aim of this 
analysis is to provide a wide understanding of how Wahhabism made its way into Russia.  
The Soviet government repressed religion and other components of national 
identity in an attempt to put into practice the project of the friendship of all the peoples 
and national unity. Same affected the notion of nationality as pointed out by Oommen54 
“the struggle of dominated nations against imperialism was recognized and given 
respectability, and the possibility of “nationalities” coexisting in the same state during the 
transitional period was conceded”. As the other former nations of the Union, the people 
of Chechnya looked for a new identity that kept their traditions and fill the blank space 
the Soviet ideology had left looking to religion as a factor of national identity55. It is 
important to mention that even when part of it, the people of Chechnya did not completely 
identify themselves with a system that felt imposed and whose leader forced their people 
out of their historic land in 194456. This could have created a resentment against the 
system that not only targeted them but many other groups and nations, hence it is 
understandable the euphoria born from the disintegration of the Soviet Union.  
To have a more accurate understanding of the reasons and means Wahhabism 
made its way into Chechnya, in this chapter the history of Wahhabism and its relation to 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where it has the status of official religion and is enforced 
by the authorities will be explored. An analysis of the armed conflicts in Afghanistan 
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during the Cold War period will follow to address the final part of this chapter with the 
introduction of Wahhabism in the northern Caucasus and the two wars against the Russian 
government, covering a period starting in 1978 through 2017 divided in two sections 
marked and separated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In the 
final section the introduction of Wahhabism, its effects and results in a period of 26 years 
will be explored.  
2.1 Understanding Wahhabism 
Wahhabism is a reformist and fundamentalist form of Islam that was born in Nedj 
in the XVIII c. from the Hanbali school of thought and whose founder Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab played an important role in its promotion and spread throughout the 
Arabian Peninsula by joining Muhammad bin Saud who would later start the ruling 
dynasty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia57. Both conquered the tribes of the peninsula 
and unified them under their stricter interpretation of Islam. Wahhabism is sometimes 
seen as the revolution of the Hanbali school from the IX c. as an attempt to purify it and 
is characterized by a literal interpretation of the Quran from which it could be possible to 
understand some of its followers’ romanticized concept of jihad. There are different 
definitions of jihad among which we can find the one by Mark (2003) as the “effort of 
struggle each Muslim faces in the everyday trials of life, such as the effort to get better 
grades in school, or the striving to achieve better results from a job, or the struggle to 
avoid sinful temptations”, he continues claiming that it “also can be applied to warfare; 
participating in jihad in Allah’s cause was the third most important good deed listed in 
the Hadith…”58. Bakker (2006) describes two types of jihad, the greater which "involves 
the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being, to struggle to improve him- 
or herself, as a result, to be a good Muslim". The second or lesser jihad “sanctions the use 
of violence against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not, and can become the means to 
mobilize that political and social struggle.” Nurutdinov (2016) states that “in Islamic law, 
the principle that, jihad can only be declared by a legitimate ruler of the country”59. For 
this study, Bakker’s definition of jihad will be used to define jihadist as those who take a 
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literal interpretation of the combination of both lesser and greater jihad to pursue their 
personal and political agenda. 
There has been research proposing a close cooperation between the Saudi 
government and the special services of England since the 50’s last century to gain the 
hegemony of the region with the help of then, foreign and today national unlimited 
resources financing extremist opposition groups to destabilize adversary governments60. 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has a close relation with Wahhabism, being the religion 
enforced by the authorities61. With the political and economic support of England and the 
United States the Kingdom strengthened and reached stability enough to start an active 
participation in international affairs that would benefit the expansion of its influence and 
its position as a hegemon in the region. As argued by Popenkov (2014), this cooperation 
with western powers and the subsequent creation of the General Intelligence Directorate 
was not exclusively motivated by commercial purposes such as oil exploration but to 
identify and monitor Soviet activities in neighboring countries62. The same way some 
modern governments use the so called soft power in order to expand their influence and 
gain sympathizers around the world, Saudi Arabia arguably uses an approach that 
includes sending fighters to countries where the Muslim population is fighting against an 
oppressor, local or foreign. These fighters do not only take with them their strategic 
knowledge in the battlefield but also their religion and understanding of how a Muslim 
society should work. Once welcomed and settled by locals, during and after the fighting 
they start modeling their surrounds to their vision.  
A second approach and one that could be easier to prove Saudi involvement in 
promotion of Wahhabism abroad is financing. This may come in two ways: one that goes 
to providing money to opposition groups or organizations63 and the construction of 
mosques and religious schools or madrassas as well as economic resources for reparations 
after armed conflicts like occurred in Bosnia – Herzegovina after 199564. Nevertheless, 
both approaches cannot be proven entirely connected to the Saudi government as some 
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fighters might be motivated by personal situations like the defense of other Muslims in 
their own interpretation of “jihad”, others looking for adventure or being recruited by 
influential individuals with no ties to the authorities. Same can be said about providing 
economic assistance, a variety of reasons that at the end all can be tracked to the same 
place, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.      
2.1.1 Afghanistan, foreign fighters and the Soviet Union (1978 – 1991)  
The religious radicalization of individuals in the Northern Caucasus should be 
seen as a process that started developing in the early 90’s with a revival of Islam in late 
80’s65 and with roots that can be traced back to 1979 with the formal date of Soviet 
military intervention in Afghanistan as a result of the national political environment in 
that country and foreign threats with geopolitical interests. With Muhammad Daoud’s 
presidency marked by a cautious approach to Moscow, as he believed in the principle of 
neutrality during the Cold War, he started distancing from the communist supporters in 
and outside of Afghanistan. Thus, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan whose 
fractions “Khalq” and “Parcham” leaders were Nur Taraki and Babrak Karmal66 who 
initially backed the president, were key initiators of the Saour Revolution in April 1978 
to overthrow the government and establish the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of 
socialist base.  
In less than ten years the state went from a kingdom with religious values and 
traditions to a republic in a path of liberalization of the economy and modernization of 
the society to finally embrace radical communist reforms. This process did not go 
unnoticed by the population in the villages and it created a shock in which those who 
considered tribal and religious traditions as a crucial part of who they were, found 
themselves in a situation where their identity was deconstructed, constructed and 
reconstructed to the desired secular one. This favored the welcoming of those who fled 
Afghanistan after the first coup d’état of 1973 and who were educated under the Wahhabi 
system in madrassas built with Saudi resources in Pakistan, one of Taraki’s foreign threats 
that turned internal preoccupations. Taraki had repeatedly asked for Soviet intervention 
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additional to the economic and military support already given to help stabilize and protect 
the country from both internal and external enemies, request that was continuously 
denied. With the assassination of Taraki by one of his fellow members of the party in 
1978, Moscow recognized the threats and the army crossed the border on December 27, 
197867. Islamic militants known as mujahedeen, arguably trained by Washington and 
financed and educated by Riyadh, started pouring into Afghanistan from the South 
gaining allies from the villages and the Soviet Army from the North protecting Kabul, 
turning an internal conflict into a proxy war between the two super powers of the time 
protecting their own geopolitical interests.  
2.1.2 The Taliban and al-Qaeda   
The mujahedeen, who claimed a religious obligation to defend their Muslim 
brothers and were first responders to the invasion of Afghanistan and who were initially 
seen as liberators and the only option for the followers of traditional Islam in the villages 
and mountains, ruled most the country after the Soviets retreated and the Union 
disintegrated in 1991 ending its support to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. For 
more than 20 years the political situation of the country has been marked by profound 
changes in the socio-political system that started with the Taliban and its leader Mullah 
Omar, madrassa educated Pashtun students and scholars who took power from the 
mujahedeen in 1996 with the intention of establishing an Islamic state in combination 
with Pashtun traditions and free Afghans from the mujahedeen rule, who were seen as 
foreigners. In 1992 when they seized power, the mujahedeen proclaimed the Islamic State 
of Afghanistan. The new government was not only made up of local Afghans who fought 
against the Soviets but also of Arabs and other Muslims who attended the call of the 
Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam promotor of personal jihad as an obligation for every 
Muslim to fight the Soviet army. He worked together with Osama bin Laden in recruiting 
fighters from Arab countries until his death in 198968. Therefore, those who stayed after 
the war, intended to create the Islamic State that mimics the lifestyle and rule of Prophet 
Muhamad through their own interpretation of the scriptures.  
The presence of foreigners dictating the rules and the fact that members of the 
Taliban, a group born in 1994 of majority Pashtun ethnicity – a minority in Afghanistan 
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– could have motivated them to fight the mujahedeen. With Mullah Omar as its leader the 
Taliban ruled the country and even had international relations with the only three 
members of the international community that officially recognized them: Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. The possible reason to the recognition given by 
these states could be attributed to the expansion of Wahhabi Islam Saudi Arabia and in 
minor part the United Arab Emirates promote, both state and private to keep homegrown 
radicals outside of the country and not represent a threat to the ruling class or simply to 
expand its geopolitical influence. As for Pakistan, with a considerable Pashtun population 
they could have preferred them fighting in the neighboring country than spreading their 
cause within their borders.  
Over five years of ruling the State, the Taliban could have been perceived as the 
answer the Afghan people needed to protect their traditions and identity from alien 
components and therefore, initially they gave them their support. This is a key element to 
understand the process of changing of power in Chechnya and it is seen in other conflicts 
in the Middle East today where we see nations that perceive themselves and their identity 
under the threat of non-traditional elements. This process can also be found in other states 
outside of the Middle East and could be related to a radical change of the political system 
in which part of the people (liberal or conservative, depending on who see themselves 
affected) tend to choose the extreme opposite type of government when this is considered 
to have changed deeply the basis of their society. In this case, conservative traditional 
Afghans felt their identity was changed with the previous government so the “pendulum” 
moved to the opposite political extreme that favored the Taliban.  
Al Qaeda was born as a response to fight the Soviet invader and once the war was 
over it kept active under Osama bin Laden’s lead. With other conflicts taking place in the 
Middle East, the Balkans and the Northern Caucasus many jihadists joined those battles 
bringing with them training, techniques, money and an unlimited network of veterans 
who advocated for a stricter form of Islam. During the Taliban regime Afghanistan 
became a training camp for jihadists who travelled from every continent. Taking 
advantage of a falling system and the growth of nationalism the euphoria of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union created, the people of Chechnya ventured into the fight 
for their independence like other former republics of the Union did.  
2.2.  Chechnya and the Soviet Union 
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The Soviet Union left Afghanistan officially in January 1989 leaving behind not 
only almost ten years of fighting and economic and military losses but also a reputation 
of a non-interventionist actor that unlike its ideological rival, arguably ventured openly 
in regions like Latin America to stop the spread of Marxism. The biggest loss though yet 
to be seen was the establishment of the fundamentalist Taliban regime in Afghanistan that 
favored the growth of Islamist groups and followers who saw in the Soviet retreat a 
victory for jihadism. The military conflicts between Chechnya and Russia in 1992 cannot 
be explained without exploring the relationship Islam and the communist regime played 
since the creation and until the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Islam, unlike Christianity 
enjoyed certain level of tolerance reflected in the initial attitude Communist authorities 
shown towards Muslims declaring they would respect their traditions, believes and 
cultural institutions69 with the intention to appeal to the “Muslim factor” when needed70. 
For this research, this relationship is explored in the period of 1978 to 1991 with slightly 
considerable reference to previous events before that date.  
2.2.1 Islam under Communism (1978 – 1991) 
It is inaccurate to tacitly express that Islam was banned in its totality under the 
Communist government, as the attitude of the authorities changed and adapted through 
time accommodating to what they considered the necessities of the people71. On the other 
hand, ignoring the repression that came after Lenin’s death would be not recognizing the 
suffering and efforts some people did to protect part of their identity and that contributed 
to the emergence of the nationalist sense of unity under Islam of the 80’s. Under the 
communist ruling, schools of Islamic education were controlled by the State or ceased to 
exist as did Sharia courts and religious publications were banned and destroyed72. The 
previous as part of an initial plan of Stalin’s totalitarian regime measures against those 
who he considered the enemy and that included members of the army, the party and 
intellectuals73.  
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For the understanding of the separatist movement in Chechnya in the 90's it is 
crucial to make reference to the time after World War II when in 1944, the people of 
Chechnya were forced out of their historic land to Kazakhstan by the Soviet government 
being only able to return 13 years later adding a new element to their national identity 
and collective memory. According to Breakwell (1986), identity is "a process with 
biological, personal and social elements that develops in time, guided by four principles: 
continuity, distinctiveness, esteem and efficacy"74, out of which the element of continuity 
played the most important role in the conservation of the Chechen identity. The element 
of continuity can be defined as the will a nation has to maintain their identity and their 
characteristics through time and this was also a key element for those who identified as 
Muslim and managed to keep their traditions and institutions to the point where the years 
the communist policies relaxed, they were able to constitute religious councils and 
continue with schools of Islamic teaching always under government control. Devine-
Wright (2003) defines collective memory as being “socially constructed and 
reconstructed over time and intimately related to people’s sense of identity…”75 and by 
following his concept we can conclude that the characteristics we see today in the Muslim 
population of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet Republics are the result of a 
series of events, sometimes extremely dramatic, that through time and space, shaped their 
perception of themselves and the “other”. From 1978 – 1989 some Muslim nations were 
socially and politically transformed creating in some the sense of a pan-Islamic identity 
equal to the Quranic Ummah or community that had to fight those who endangered the 
existence of the Muslim people. People who had different traditions and customs and 
even interpretations of Islam, but that under the freedom fighters liberated them, had to 
accept their vision of Islam and unify under an ideal Islamic State. 
2.3 Chechnya and Russia  
For over a decade the people of Chechnya experienced a mix of political 
instability with sporadic stability and euphoria caused by the sense of belonging to their 
own historical land and the constitution of their own separate state in 1991. For this work, 
a historical analysis of the recognized and non-recognized political structure of Chechnya 
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from 1991 to 2017 will be explored and divided into three stages: the Chechen Republic 
of Ichkeria, the Chechen Republic and the Caucasus Emirate.  
2.3.1 The Chechen Republic of Ichkeria  
With of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the people of Chechnya supported a 
movement of independence with Dzhokhar Dudayev as first president from 1991 to 1996, 
who envisioned a secular democratic State in the constitution of 1992 but despite this 
intended separation of religion and government, the clergy played an important role in 
supporting the government during the first Chechen war in 1994 using the Muslim factor 
and calling for jihad against the aggressions76. Taking into consideration that traditionally 
the people of Chechnya are followers of Sufi Islam together with a mix of other local 
values and traditions, when foreign fighters who participated in Afghanistan and new 
ones coming from the Middle East and Europe started pouring into the country importing 
a more radical interpretation of Islam like Wahhabism, it represented an ethnoreligious 
shock.  
When the armed conflict started in December 1994 and the Russian army 
advanced to Grozny, Dudayev’s government having called for jihad with the support of 
the clergy under mufti Akhmad Kadyrov, can be considered, according to Nurutdinov’s 
described characteristics of jihad, a legal act under Islamic law. With Dudayev’s death in 
April 1996, his vice president Zemlikhan Yandarbiev took power. Yandarbiev was 
himself a secular scholar, but with the armed conflict and foreign fighters pouring into 
the country to wave jihad against Moscow, he could have got in touch with Wahhabi 
leaders like Bagaudin Kebedov accused by mufti A. Kadyrov of introducing this strict 
interpretation of Islam in Chechnya77 78. This armed conflict between Russian and 
Chechen forces became too bloody and casualties on both sides were considerable, with 
Grozny destroyed and opposition in Russia to a prolonged war both governments started 
negotiations for a cease fire agreement that would return the status quo and set the bases 
for the future relations between Moscow and Grozny. The Khasav-Yurtov agreement was 
negotiated by generals A. Maskhadov and A. Lebed in the summer of 1996 and finalized 
in August 31 same year79. After the war was over, the conditions in the Chechen Republic 
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of Ichkeria were inadequate to provide jobs, security and social stability that criminality 
hiked caused by local and foreign fighters who disagreed with the cease fire and saw the 
agreement as a victory for Moscow, many of those were Wahhabi followers who aligned 
with president Yandarbiev and were since then, a strong group that destabilized the future 
government and its efforts to bring peace.  
The Khasav-Yurtov agreement did not grant the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
with independence but provided certain guarantees beneficial for both sides like the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechen territory and the commitment to negotiate 
the status of the republic before December 31, 200180. With this agreement signed and 
coming elections next year, president Yandarbiev invalidated the Constitution of 1992 
and its secular foundations creating the Supreme sharia courts in October that year with 
Sh. Batukaev as joint mufti of A. Kadyrov, having a vision of a unified Islamic state but 
little support from the people of Chechnya and the clergy who considered the nation was 
not ready for such a change81.  With the elections of 1997, A. Maskhadov became third 
president of the republic and tried to limit the influence Wahhabis had in the government 
but at the same time, proclaimed the adoption of a sharia constitution as the growth of 
Wahhabism threatened the stability of his government and this may have been seen as a 
good concession to followers of Yandarbiev and Kebedov82. This is the moment when 
we can see the split that will cause inside rebellions and division of the nation since, as 
mentioned before the majority of Chechens and the Sufi clergy did not support 
Yandarbiev’s actions on the path of islamization but now they had a new leader they could 
rally behind who was considered closer to Moscow, was fighting criminality and trying 
to reconstruct the country, and on the other side Yandarbiev was a very active politician 
who enjoyed the support of Wahhabi leaders and militias who stayed in the country after 
the war ended and some of them changed their considered “heroic” activities for criminal 
ones, like that of July 18, 1998 when members of the Sharia guard who worked as security 
prison helped escape 32 highly dangerous convicts83, hence became the target of 
Maskhadov’s actions. This situation can also be analyzed as the of struggle for power, 
where Sufi leaders may have considered Wahhabis a threat to their influence and control 
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on the region, mufti A. Kadyrov was the first and only one to have opposed the 
introduction of the Wahhabi ideology in the first half of the decade as he was one of the 
most educated men on Islam in Chechnya and considered they intended to establish a 
Caliphate with Arab traditions and customs pushing local culture aside84.  
A. Kadyrov became an important actor in the fight against the spread of 
Wahhabism in Chechnya by calling on meetings with the clergy of Ingushetia and 
Dagestan in the summer of 1998 to decide the actions to take for the protection of the 
youth, prohibition of propaganda pro-Wahhabi and proper religious education85. We can 
distinguish a third line that is shaped on the direction the leadership took with mufti 
Kadyrov leading those who followed Sufi Islam with characteristics that included 
Chechen culture and traditions unlike Wahhabism, a “branch” of Sunni Islam, with Arab 
customs and a strict interpretation of the scriptures whose leaders and representatives 
supported Sharia courts with corporal punishments and violent jihad. Maskhadov’s 
government was in the middle of this religious confrontation with what initially was 
meant to be a secular government turned into one that supported and even employed 
Wahhabi members and the functioning Supreme sharia court, including a sharia 
constitution being worked out. A government that had to face a second armed conflict 
with Russia in 1999 due to continuous clashes jihadi militias of Saudi warlord Ibn al-
Khattab and former vice-Primer Minister Shamil Basayev made up of Chechens, Arabs 
and other mujahedin had with the Russian army in the borders with Dagestan and Russia. 
Ibn al-Khattab and Basayev planned the incursion to Dagestan in order to provide support 
for Wahhabi followers there bearing the idea of a future consolidation of a Caliphate in 
the region.   
2.3.2 Chechen Republic  
For over nine months, the Russian Army managed to gain control of Chechnya in 
May 2000 and mufti A. Kadyrov was appointed interim head of government by President 
Vladimir Putin. A. Kadyrov is criticized by Chechen Islamic fundamentalist for being a 
traitor having turned to Moscow and not joined the fight in the second war ignoring his 
Muslim brothers, his decision could be explained by his position against a growing 
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Wahhabi movement in Chechnya and the possible perception he had of Sufism losing 
influence in the region86, as well as the atrocities committed against the people of 
Chechnya by the new Wahhabi authorities, sometimes made up of foreign members. On 
the other hand, ex-president A. Kadyrov is seen today as a figure of national pride by 
Chechen nationalist and Sufi leaders who see in him a strong man who fought a foreign 
agent that oppressed Chechens with a wrong interpretation of Islam, and after his 
assassination in 2005 by Islamic fundamentalists, his son Ramzan Kadyrov who is current 
head of government, allegedly has managed to provide stability to the country and 
continued the fight against Islamic fundamentalism and its criminal actions in the 
Republic. Maskhadov’s government continued to exist but was not functional as the 
Russian forces occupied Chechen territory, created a new constitution replacing the one 
based on Sharia law, and legitimized A. Kadyrov as head of government. Until his death 
in 2005, Maskhadov led the insurgency aimed at ousting the Russian forces out of 
Chechnya as well as coordinated terrorist operations against civilians in Russian territory. 
Abdul Halim Sadulayev succeeded Maskhadov, and it was during his time that we see a 
tendency leaning towards a pan-Islamic movement attempting to unify Muslims of the 
Northern Caucasus. With his assassination in the summer of 2006, Dokka Umarov was 
given the position of president of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria with Akhmad 
Zakayev as Prime Minister.   
2.3.3 Caucasus Emirate 
New president Dokka Umarov was given a decaying government in war with 
Moscow that was also fighting opposition of Sufi leaders and their Chechen followers. 
The religious factor played again a relevant role in unifying fighters against the enemy, 
Umarov declared the creation of the Caucasus Emirate in October 31, 2007 and himself 
as emir of the new Islamic state in the region that was not limited to Chechnya but the 
entire Northern Caucasus. This could have come as a response to the weakening of their 
separatist movement under the Republic of Ichkeria, that lost the war, hence its 
government structure and its governed incapable of being called a state any longer. Prime 
Minister Zakayev went on exile to London87 with the intention of giving continuity to 
their government but with no support from the recognized authorities under Ramzan 
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Kadyrov’s presidency, it ceased to exist. The Caucasus Emirate continued a campaign of 
terror in Russian soil and allegedly contributes with the radicalization of citizens of the 
Russian Federation. Both Russian and Chechen authorities have been fighting Umarov’s 
project successfully with some critics against it like that of Muslim men who followers 
of a stricter interpretation of Islam but were not followers of Umarov’s ideas were 
targeted by Chechen special forces due to their garments and particular beards that were 
considered traditional Wahhabi signs88. Head of government R. Kadyrov has declared a 
victory on terrorism and minimized the existence of the Caucasus Emirate thanks to the 
elimination of its members. Nonetheless, a sect called “khabashity” is starting to be 
considered a new threat for Muslims in the region of the Northern Caucasus with some 
of its representatives using propaganda to spread its ideology89. Additional to the 
khabashity, those who went to wave jihad in Syria and Iraq for the Islamic State of 
Ibrahim once they return, there is fear they might boost the dying jihadi fighters in the 
region.   
Through the analysis of cross-cultural relations between Muslims and non-
Muslims in Russia it is possible to say that this is better than the one in Western countries 
as the first is less perceived as “an invasion” of the other since arguably, most non-
Muslims in Russia know there are republics part of the Russian Federation with a Muslim 
majority who are Russian citizens. Nevertheless, this relation has been shaped by a recent 
dramatic series of events during the end of the XX c. that affected both groups and 
contributed to the creation of a collective memory of mistrust and sometimes resentment. 
Stability has returned to the region of the Northern Caucasus but some members of the 
Caucasus Emirate continue their criminal actions, that combined with the constant threat 
of radical fundamentalism capable of spreading in the region, has given Kadyrov’s 
government and the Russian intelligence services areas of opportunity to work on. 
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CHAPTER 3. CIVILIAN DISCOURSE ON WAHHABISM AND ISLAM 
This chapter will cover different discourses on the relation between Wahhabism 
and Islam and how it is presented by politicians, scientist (academics) and nationalist 
groups. These three groups are considered representatives of the society in this research 
as they do not follow a religious line and are supposed to attract followers of all groups. 
As explored in chapter I, discourse can be used to get power and control as well as to 
create and promote an ideology, hence this issue is approached through the analysis of 
groups with access to the dominated and not through the dominated themselves. This 
study is not conclusive and leaves room for further analysis from the approach of the 
dominated and their perception of Wahhabism and Islam. The chapter will be divided into 
three sections in which the available discourses given by representatives of each group 
are analyzed. Recognizing the difficulty to reach out to some groups like nationalists, this 
discourse will be the one available on their sites, social media, publications or news 
reports that, might not be conclusive but provide a crucial understanding of their position 
towards Islam in Russia.  
3.1 Political Discourse  
This section will include the analysis of fragments of interviews or declarations 
given by President Putin, Head of government Ramzan Kadyrov, Vice Chairman of the 
State Duma Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Deputy of the State Duma Shamsail Saraliev, 
selected for their direct address to Wahhabism. Article 3 and 29 of the Constitution of the 
Russian Federation (1993) set the line that the official discourse follows on 
multinationalism and multi-confessionalism, dictating the position of the government and 
politicians on Islam, in this case. Provision 79 of the Strategy of National Security (see 
chapter I, subchapter 1.3.1) includes the protection of the multinational culture of the 
Russian Federation as a priority, of which Islam is part of it. The existence of Islamic 
universities in cities like Grozny, Kazan and Moscow, to mention a few, funded by the 
government and in close cooperation with it, can be considered an evidence of the 
authorities’ position. But this discourse could not work if the majority of the people of 
the Russian Federation did not identify or recognize themselves as a multinational and 
multi-confessional State. This attitude could be the result of the Marxist vision of “the 
proletariat having no fatherland and nationalism as a form of false consciousness”90 that 
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was predominant during the years of the Soviet Union and the attempt to create a new 
Soviet identity.  
Analyzed from a top to bottom structure, the position the President of the 
Federation sets on this specific topic is critical as his ideas and actions create a precedent 
for how other politicians who belong to the power structure, and accept the President’s 
stance, will behave. It can be said President Putin has had a strategy of approaching 
religious leaders, in this case Muslim, in an attempt to create the conditions for dialogue 
that go beyond the traditional multi-confessional Christian – Muslim but also, giving 
recognition and a space in the Russian government to the representatives of a considerable 
part of the population. This might come with the necessity to acknowledge national 
differences like, Tatars, Chechens, Ingush and immigrants from the Post-Soviet space 
who also identify as Muslims, sometimes on the same level they identify as citizens or 
residents of the Russian Federation, having a Muslim Russian identity. Therefore, it is 
inaccurate to say that the Russian government has a tough position against Islam or its 
followers91, despite of being a country with historic roots in Orthodox Christianity and 
the usual realist Western approach of clash of civilizations in which Christianity and Islam 
are in confrontation. In the Federation, it is not unusual to see leaders of both major 
religions together in public events next to state authorities or the other way around, with 
state authorities present in religious events in representation of the government. This 
should not be seen as the Christianization or Islamization of the government but rather as 
the Russian approach to cultural relativism92 in which all cultures are equal but different 
and their characteristics are taken into consideration in the decision-making. This 
closeness of the Russian government can also be seen as the attempt to prevent 
radicalization of individuals on both Christian and Muslim circles, as proposed by 
Nurutdinov93 in his measures to fight Wahhabism that should involve the support of the 
Russian government to the formation of religious scholars. Nevertheless, some groups 
could take advantage of this closeness to advance their political agendas.  
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The law known as The Freedom of Consciousness and Religious Institutions94 can 
be seen as part of the political discourse that limited or controlled the actions of certain 
religious groups, some considered sects and non-traditional. It is crucial to understand 
this law was introduced after the first Chechen war and seems to be consistent with the 
position of the government to fight religious extremism of that time. As Dr. Natalia 
Kovalevskaia suggests:   
The situation was becoming very uneasy because there were not only Protestants, 
Catholics or Baptists coming - there were lots of Religious sects. (like e.g. Aum 
Sernrike). And as we had freedom of Religious Believes (according to the 
previous law of 1990) it was difficult to regulate that. They went to schools and 
universities and started their aggressive missionary activity. So, this new law was 
introduced in order to eliminate the peril of foreign sects coming to Russia. It 
regulated how international Religious Organizations should be registered on the 
territory of the Russian Federation to start their activities. Moreover, in practice it 
highlighted the role of Russian Orthodox Church as "pre-dominant" Religious 
Institution in Russia naming other confessions too.95 
Having clarified that the government’s stance on Islam is one of closeness and 
dialogue, we can move to the analysis of extremism as one of the motivations for this 
cooperation. In chapter II it was described how Wahhabism made its way to the separatist 
groups that fought in the Northern Caucasus, inspired by a call to wave jihad against what 
they perceived as the aggressor, after the conflict and with the measures the government 
of A. Kadyrov took against Wahhabi jihadists, the survivors were forced to go into hiding, 
under the intelligence services monitoring. In an interview for a French broadcaster in 
2000 President Putin clarified some points, critical for the understanding of the 
relationship between the authorities and Muslims and the perception of it in France. This 
interview was given nine months after the second Chechen war was over and A. Kadyrov 
was appointed interim head of government by Putin himself, A. Maskhadov was still 
president of the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, that had no more control over 
the territory and had gone into hiding.  
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To the interviewer’s question asking if he considered French authorities were not 
fully aware of the fact that Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya, Central Asia and the 
Arab world were a threat not only for Russia but also for Europe his answer was: 
...But if someone in the world or in Europe does not notice - or for some reason 
tries not to notice - the danger or international terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism 
and extremism of another religious sense, I'm convinced, this is a mistake...96 
Here he mentioned three concepts, international terrorism, Islamic 
fundamentalism and extremism of other religious sense. The previous can be part of the 
speech technique known as the rule of three in which we group three related words or 
points of view, as things that come in three are more persuasive and easy to remember 
since we use patterns to process information. It is necessary to remark that these three 
concepts are not entirely focused on Islam or its followers but rather to a wider range of 
possibilities that could include international actors not necessarily Islamic or Muslim and 
other religious groups. Additionally, in his answer he put weight on Islamic 
fundamentalism and considering the historical events of the 90’s, this can be observed as 
moving the Western discourse that links terrorism to Islam in general, onto 
fundamentalism in this case Wahhabism and deliver a message to the French people, with 
a considerable Muslim population, that the Russian government was not fighting Islam, 
like he mentioned in the same interview:  
Because of that, when they say that Russia fights against Muslims, - it's a 
shameless lie! Russia protected Muslims in Dagestan, protected from fanatics and 
religious extremists, in this case under the slogan of Islam. Not to see this, is an 
illusion, a mistake and a harmful error. 
Next, he addressed the situation in Chechnya after the second war with a clear and 
direct answer on who was to blame for the violence in the region. 
...we had a determinate ideological aggression from so-called Wahhabism, a 
stream of Islam, alien to the population of our Northern Caucasus. At the end, 
Chechnya turned into a foothold for attacks on other Russian territories under the 
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slogan of the creation of the so-called new state formation of - The United States 
of Islam - from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 
According to Russian dictionaries, we can observe as minimum two meanings of 
так называемый (so-called) construction: 1) “Именуемый, носящий название” or 
named, having X name, and 2) “мнимый” or false97, with this, Putin seems to be trying 
to minimize the importance and legitimacy of this group. Finally, he concluded with: 
The important for us is - to exclude any possibilities of using the territory of 
Chechnya as a foothold to launch attacks on Russia. That's the first interest. The 
second - to free the Chechen people from fundamentalism and give them the right 
to determine themselves their own life with the help of democratic political 
processes. 
The first interest, demonstrates the necessity the Federal government considered 
critical to secure stability in other regions of the country, as it was happening in 
neighboring regions like Dagestan with Wahhabi groups committing violent acts and then 
hiding in Chechnya, and the decade of 2000 with attacks in Moscow and Volgograd, to 
mention a few, where despite the major military operation was over, some small active 
groups continued their activities. The second interest insists on fundamentalism being the 
enemy but this time he shows it is not only for the Russian government but also for the 
people of Chechnya, and they had to be liberated from it, which happened in May that 
year. The last two paragraphs analyzed, also give the perception the government sees 
Wahhabism as something foreign like it does with other actors or elements, usually 
cultural and chooses to exert tight control on them or ban them at all.  
The current Head of government of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov has developed a 
pertinent role as both, a religious and political leader in the Northern Caucasus since he 
was first designated president of the Chechen Republic in 2007. Some of his declarations 
as political leader are included in this section, since this could be more valuable for the 
purpose of this research. Nevertheless, his political activities are intrinsically related to 
religion and hence, these declarations may have taken place in such events. In a working 
meeting between Putin and Kadyrov in March 2007, Putin announced he had proposed 
Kadyrov's candidacy for President of Chechnya and recognized the steps taken for the 
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development of the republic. He also asked him to continue the rehabilitation of Chechnya 
in all aspects. Kadyrov's answer included a short reference to Wahhabism and 
international terrorism in the same sentence, demonstrating that for him and his 
workgroup, both are related.  
...I will do everything in order to adequately continue the work that was started by 
my father and you. For the people of our republic, for our citizens to live with 
dignity, like others. For them to feel safe. And that in our country there will be no 
further manifestations such as international terrorism and Wahhabism. (...)98 
One year later and with less than one month of becoming Prime minister, V. Putin 
was interviewed by Le Monde on various issues, among them the Northern Caucasus and 
the operations taken over 10 years back99. To the question about what were the main 
problems, from his point of view, in Ingushetia and Dagestan after Chechnya had 
stabilized, his answered included a short historical reference to the reasons the region first 
destabilized, this included a mention of Wahhabism but this time in a different manner 
even making clear, that Wahhabism is simply another current in Islam and in itself, exist 
extremists.  
The situation in the Chechen Republic has really improved. And it has improved 
due to several circumstances. The main one is that the Chechen people made a 
choice for themselves. And this choice in the direction of the development of their 
republic within the Russian Federation. And we see it, we know. We saw the 
reaction of the Chechen people to the attempts to introduce non-traditional forms 
of Islam in the minds of the local population first of all. Now, this is where it 
started. Wahhabism, in its original form is a normal current in Islam, nothing 
terrible here. But there are extremist movements within Wahhabism itself. These 
are the directions they tried to introduce in the consciousness of the Chechen 
people.  
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In this paragraph, it is evident the attempt to demonstrate the Chechen people were 
capable enough of identifying their future and their enemy, and then, those who did not 
agree with the extremist Wahhabi groups, opted to join the Russian troops in the fighting. 
This interview and the one previously analyzed of 2000, also for a French broadcaster, 
may show how critical some were in France, and probably in other Western countries, of 
the military measures the then, President Putin took in Chechnya. Even today, some 
analysts like to compare the Russian military operation in Grozny with the one in 
Aleppo100. Back to Putin’s more moderate approach to Wahhabism as Prime Minister in 
2008, that can be explained by the fact that more information on the issue was available 
eight years after the second war, closer cooperation with Muslim leaders in the region, 
and the knowledge and expertise of former head of government Akhmad Kadyrov who 
was a prominent scholar on Islam could have been essential in this new understanding.  
In a 2013 meeting with the leaders of parliamentary factions with President Putin 
at the State Duma, Vladimir Zhirinovsky's speech included the following reference to 
Wahhabism and the situation with national security:  
National security is a problem of Islamization, Wahhabism. We saw the action in 
Surgut. It is also necessary here to strengthen our internal security organs 
precisely in terms of combating religious extremism. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, other 
countries allocate huge funds. There is a construction of certain religious 
institutions, training in the Arab countries in their universities of preachers and 
the organization of Muslims - every Friday all the men in a certain place gather. 
It unites them, aura such, community. This is a certain threat.101 
Zhirinovsky’s speech is relevant because he explicitly blames Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar for funding extremist groups and somehow indoctrinating Muslims through 
education in Arab countries, a similar approach that former President of Chechnya, A. 
Kadyrov had proposed (this will be analyzed in chapter IV).  
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Later that year, in an op-ed for Izvestia online, Deputy Shamsail Saraliev102 wrote 
how in recent years, crimes of religious character have increased, and Russian citizens by 
default consider Muslims the main perpetrators103. This vision could also describe the 
attitude in the European Union and the United States where, whenever a crime on 
religious basis occurs, the media is the first to suggest Muslims were involved.  
For any reasonably intelligent person, it is obvious that considering all Muslims 
the enemy, is a big mistake. Because there are Muslims and there are so-called 
Kharijites (from the Arab rebels, schismatics) - a radical sect, which has nothing 
to do with Islam. These "Shaytans" profess an extremist ideology - Wahhabism 
imposed by false preachers in the lost minds and consciousness of the followers 
of this current.  
Islam and Wahhabism are opposite concepts, far from each other in their essence. 
Islam - the religion of peace, good and tolerance, is a traditional culture and a high 
morality, where there is no place for chaos and violence...Because of the brutality 
of the acts committed by them in all corners of the world, and the false beliefs 
diverging from the provisions of Islam, Wahhabis cannot be considered Muslims. 
Embraced in the religious shell ideology, which they impose, sows hatred and 
fear. 
He considers an international network of Wahhabis are trying to destabilize the 
country in regard to interethnic and interfaith grounds and compares it to fascism. He 
concludes writing "Wahhabism is the main threat to Russia's stability, and this terrible 
disease must be urgently treated. The misanthropic ideology should not have the right to 
exist neither in the world, nor in our country!" 
In February 2016, R. Kadyrov, being one of the participants in the clergy meeting 
that gathered representatives of neighboring Dagestan and Ingushetia to Grozny, 
delivered a speech to the crew attending the meeting at the Akhmad Kadyrov Mosque104. 
                                                          
102 Deputy Saraliev is a Chechen politician, Muslim and member of United Russia Party, and served in the sixth and 
seventh convocation for the State Duma. 
103 Shamsail Saraliev. Islam and Wahhabism are different concepts. 27 December 2013 // Izvestia  (Шамсаил 
Саралиев. Ислам и ваххабизм — это разные понятия.  27 декабря 2013 // Известия) URL: 
http://izvestia.ru/news/563297 (date of retrieval 17.02.2017) 
104 Uspanov, Beslan, Magomed Edilsultanov. "We will fight against Wahhabis everywhere: in Chechnya, Ingushetia, 
Dagestan ..." 03 February 2016 // Kavpolit (Успанов, Беслан, Магомед Эдилсултанов. «Мы будем бороться с 
ваххабистами везде: в Чечне, Ингушетии, Дагестане...» 03 февраля 2016 // Кавполит) 
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In this speech, he slashed against Wahhabis and Salafists. It is important to mention, the 
clergy of the three republics, Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia concluded a resolution 
on Wahhabism with some measures to counter its expansion and influence in the region. 
This document will be analyzed in chapter IV.     
...We all remember how in 1998-99 Akhmat-haji called muridov and stated about 
the need to stop Wahhabism in the republic. If we do not stop them, it will get 
worse, another war will begin. 
He challenged the Wahhabis in the most terrible time, when they killed everyone 
who did not share their ideology without ceremony. They killed many descendants 
of the prophet and followers of the righteous. Scoffing, saying: "Well, I pray for 
my own wish for salvation, where is he? (...) 
...We are afraid that they will bring trouble on us. I declare to you responsibly, in 
December 1999, I, my comrades - Ruslan Alkhanov - swore on the Koran that 
until our death we will fight with the Wahhabis. 
We do not care where they (Wahhabis) are in Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan or 
even in North Africa. If these pests cannot be stopped on the ground, and if they 
do not come to their senses and repent, they will find what they are looking for. 
Everyone will find what he is looking for… 
 
In the first paragraph, like president Putin’s interview of 2008 Kadyrov starts with 
a historical reference and here referring to his father and his call to stop Wahhabis who 
were part of Maskhadov’s government. This could help to gather not only Chechens 
behind the figure of his father but also Ingush and Dagestanis who see in religious 
extremism today a threat, similar to the one faced by A. Kadyrov almost 20 years ago. 
This strategy serves well to create an identity that goes well beyond nationality and unites 
them under a single Muslim identity. In the second paragraph, he draws a clear line 
between “them” and “us” when he says, “they killed everyone who did not share their 
ideology” and “they killed many descendants of the prophet and followers of the 
righteous”, as he is discrediting their beliefs by calling it an ideology and differentiating 
the “murderers” from the true “descendants of the prophet”. Next, he creates a perception 
that he and his people have been in a constant battle against Wahhabis (since 1999) 
protecting Islam in Chechnya and giving continuity to the struggle his father led until his 
death. The last paragraph can be seen as a show of strength very similar to the one made 
by Putin as Prime Minister of Yeltsin in 1999 on terrorism:  
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We are going to pursue terrorists everywhere. If they are in the airport, we will 
pursue them in the airport. And if we capture them in the toilet, then we will waste 
them in the outhouse. … The issue has been resolved once and for all.105 
 
The fragments of speeches, interviews, and written contributions to newspapers 
presented here by some politicians are an example of the discourse on Islam and 
Wahhabism prominent in the federation. Nevertheless, this analysis of political discourse 
is not conclusive since, this research is not only about political discourse on Islam and 
Wahhabism, and the extension of this work is limited but it is possible to say that this 
approach from politicians is the mainstream tendency, following the Constitution of the 
Federation articles 3 and 29 and the official government position of national unity. The 
President’s discourse focuses more on calling out extremism and international terrorism 
than accusing Islam or Muslims for the crimes committed by jihadists. R. Kadyrov’s 
discourse is more specific and overwhelming as he identifies Wahhabis as the enemy of 
the Chechen people and Muslims in the Northern Caucasus. Deputy Saraliev is also tough 
and decisive in making the difference between Muslims and Wahhabis, but we have to 
consider that both Kadyrov and Saraliev are Muslim and therefore, they also have a 
second identity besides the “politician” one, and because of that, their discourse is more 
detailed and emotional than that of Putin or Zhirinovsky.  
3.2 Academic Discourse  
This subchapter will cover the analysis of some Russian scholars who have studied 
Wahhabism and its relationship with Islam in Russia, how to prevent and fight 
radicalization, Islam and models of politics, and of course, the Northern Caucasus. These 
scholars were chosen for their knowledge based on the articles found in the Russian online 
academic database “elibrary.com” when entered the keyword “Wahhabism”, and not 
strategically selected to demonstrate the superiority of one point of view over the other. 
Arguably, with more critical thinking skills, academics have a wider perspective and 
understanding of social issues in this case, which could have a direct effect on the result 
of the research these Russian scholars performed.  
                                                          
105 Putin on “wasting terrorists in the outhouse”: wrong rhetoric, right idea. 15 July 2011 // RT 
<https://www.rt.com/politics/putin-honesty-president-magnitogorsk/> (date of retrieval 30.03.2017) 
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M. A. Suchkov provides a structured analysis of the similarities between the 
Islamic State and the Caucasus Emirate that demonstrates his knowledge on security 
issues and terrorism, this is not what makes his work relevant but his comparison between 
these two actors106. Though he does not explicitly mention Wahhabism as the origin of 
the Caucasus Emirate, this was covered before in this research with Musaykhanov’s 
historical approach explaining how Wahhabis made their way to the Chechen government 
and created a Sharia constitution107, that later during the war, separated from the 
moderates and tried to establish the Emirate. In his work “The influence of ISIS on the 
Russian Northern Caucasus”, Suchkov at all times mentions the “Caucasus Emirate” to 
address the groups of jihadists who follow similar values to those of the Islamic State 
fighters, he even includes Dokka Umarov who in 2013, provided funding to the Islamic 
State108. Suchkov does give a crucial reference to understanding the reasons, from a 
security approach, the Russian government decided to participate in fighting the Islamic 
State in Syria:  
 
…the fight against international terrorism does not guarantee security for the 
country. For the Kremlin, the conclusion was analogue: the suppression of internal 
challenges does not mean that they will not emerge in other regions and will not 
come back stronger and more dangerous109. 
Since the Islamic State shares an ideology based on Islamism and jihadism to gain 
political control and legitimacy, using Sharia as the legal model to shape the society’s 
values in the Caliphate and Emirate, the Kremlin considered crucial to join the fight in 
Syria against this group to preserve the stability achieved in the Norther Caucasus and 
prevent the re-strengthening of paramilitary Islamist groups.  
Musaykhanov differentiates two currents of Islam in the Chechen Republic of the 
early 90’s when Yandarbiev established Sharia courts with followers of Wahhabism: 
“The traditional clergy (leaders of Sufi brotherhoods) did not support the idea of creating 
an Islamic State and Sharia courts in Chechnya…”110 Sufism, together with local 
traditions, is seen as the accepted interpretation of Islam in the Northern Caucasus and 
                                                          
106 Suchkov, M. A. The influence of IGIL On the Russian North Caucasus. Islam in the Near and Middle East 
(Сучков М.А. Влияние Игил На Российский Северный Кавказ. Ислам на Ближнем и Среднем Востоке). 2015. 
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107 Musaykhanov, S. S. P. 79 
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Wahhabism, as the foreign addition that tried to take over, and Musaykhanov makes sure 
this is well understood. The constant of a perceived foreign threat is also present here 
with Sufi – local, Wahhabi – foreign, and there is a need to be protected from it by the 
State111.  
Popenkov gives also a historical approach to the understanding of Wahhabism in 
the Northern Caucasus, with a throwback to the foundation of the modern Saudi Kingdom 
with the help of the United Kingdom in 1932112 but goes even further to establish Saudi 
responsibility for the chaotic situation in the Norther Caucasus:  
The Kingdom only expanded over the past decades, the range of its tasks with 
regard to our country, including in them, the support to the Taliban movement in 
the time of the USSR war in Afghanistan, the development and financing of 
projects to destabilize the situation and former Soviet republics of Central Asia 
after the disintegration of the USSR, and in especial in the Caucasus.113  
Popenkov clearly links Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, with 
support that may have included financing and arming the mujahedeen, concluding in 
Chechnya and Dagestan. He also proposes a theory in which British, Turkish and Arab 
special services had a plan to divide Russia and create an Islamic State in the 90’s114.  
Popenkov’s article is an analysis of the Saudi – Wahhabi relation and its involvement in 
the Northern Caucasus, he does not mention any reference to stating that Sufi Muslims 
were responsible for the destabilization of the 90’s but rather an outside ideological force 
pushed into the region by the West with the clear objective of weakening Russia.  
Nurutdinov and Safin, after a historical review of the roots of Wahhabism, quote 
Dzutsev and Pershchits who mention, Al-Wahhab considered Islam, “needed a holy war 
("jihad") against the unfaithful”115. Their analysis gives an idea of how they perceive 
Wahhabism as a “religious deviation”116 apart from Islam when they state that “the 
ideological basis of Wahhabi teachings provides a passive support to terrorist activities, 
committed in the name of Islam”117. With this, they make the point that Wahhabism is 
                                                          
111 General provision 79 of the Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation of 2015.  
112 Popenkov, O. N. P. 41 
113 Ibid. P. 42 
114 Popenkov, O. N. P. 42 
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some type of ideology different from Islam, in this analysis they mention Sufism 
repeatedly to compare both currents, that has to be "spread on Muslim countries"118.  
In his article “Experience and prospects of countering Wahhabism in the Russian 
Federation”, Nurutdinov approaches Wahhabism from a security perspective with special 
attention to discourse and rhetoric, and well-defined groups: Wahhabis and Muslims. He 
repeatedly he uses the construction "the fight against Wahhabism" to refer to the activities 
the Federal and Muslim authorities have taken against extremists. Nurutdinov mentions 
some steps taken by the Muslim clergy to de-Wahhabize Tatarstan like deposing imams 
who had Islamic foreign education and the stimulation of patriotism among Russian 
Muslims119. The last can be proved in some education programs part of Islamic 
universities in the country. In his research, he recognizes the role social media has in 
fighting the Wahhabi ideology, “Proceeding from the fact that, the rhetoric, that 
deconstructs a negative image of Wahhabism, is presented, first of all, in Internet, major 
efforts should be taken in the virtual world.” 120 He also understands that discourse can 
be used to neutralize the Wahhabi - jihadists rhetoric online but it will only work on those 
who are open to participate in a discussion on what jihad really is and throw away the 
propagandist idea given by Wahhabis121. Finally, Nurutdinov, Safin and Salagaev with 
an analysis of Russian printed media, conclude “Wahhabism as a religious deviation is 
constructed, basically, with the help of discourse on terrorism and the opposition of 
Wahhabism to traditional Islam” 122. Attempts were made to reach out to Nurutdinov 
through email for more details on his perception of Wahhabism as a deviation from Islam 
but unfortunately, they were unsuccessful.  
Tsurkan identifies five political models in Muslim countries that differentiate the 
relation between the state and Islamic radicalism: “harmony of Wahhabism and the state 
powers, Islamization of politics in a Shiite state, coordination between secular powers 
and Islamic radicals, moderate Islamism in the political system and confrontation between 
secular powers and Islamic radicals.123 The first model, “harmony of Wahhabism and the 
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state” she mentions Saudi Arabia as the perfect example of this and calls it an “Islamic 
state of radical fundamentalism”124. She describes how this country lives under Sharia 
and applies punishments that may include death for violations of religious laws125 and 
also provides a description of other states like Palestine or Morocco where the relation 
between the authorities and Islam differs to the Saudi model and does not include 
Wahhabism.  
Radzhabov explores the contradictions between Sufism and Wahhabism126. He 
refers to the dissolution of the Soviet Union to mark the start of religious confrontation 
between traditional Sufism in Dagestan and the outsider Wahhabi ideology.127 According 
to Radzhabov, “both trends on the fundamental principles of the Quran and the Sunnah, 
have serious contradictions”, including practices like the visits to cemeteries or the 
celebration of the Prophet’s birthday128.  
Through a content analysis of the work of some Russian academics, it is evident 
there are specialists (men and women) who know and study the differences between 
traditional Islam in its Sufi current and a more radical form or Wahhabism. They know 
the historical roots of Wahhabism and how it made its way into Russia and have sufficient 
knowledge on the topic and those whose works are included here, never relate traditional 
Islam with international terrorism. Some of these academics portray Wahhabism as a 
foreign element of destabilization and even a deviation of Islam, and some go as far as 
saying it is the result of a Saudi plan in coordination with the West to destroy what was 
left of Russia after the Soviet Union. It is relevant to mention some of these academics 
might be Muslim but this is not possible to demonstrate.  
3.3 Nationalist Discourse  
This section includes the thoughts and ideas of nationalist groups or organizations 
and individuals who have made reference to Wahhabism or Islam in any of their public 
discourses. Nationalists can be defined as those individuals who abide “the tendency on 
the part of the dominant nation/ethnie to establish hegemony over the smaller/weaker 
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nations and ethnies”129. Gathering information from nationalist individuals or groups on 
Islam and Wahhabism was extremely difficult because there are not many sources 
available. This can be due to the current legal frame against extremism, and hence there 
are not many publications or websites. Also, in the information that was available, 
nationalists never mention Wahhabism as the reason of extremism in Islam, and tend to 
generalize all Muslims pose a danger.  
Konstantin Poltoranin who in his multiple works that can be classified as “non-
fiction” books, put all followers of Islam into one big group that is simply mentioned as 
“Muslims”, ignoring the canonical and cultural differences between Sufi Muslims in 
Russia and Wahhabis who in some cases, radicalize and commit violent crimes. Another 
constant in Poltoranin’s work is the status they intent to give to migrants with followers 
of Islam as proved by the following fragment where he interviews Vyacheslav 
Postavnin130:  
(Poltoranin) - In Russia today, we have basically Muslim immigrants, and this 
calls for a grow in xenophobia.  
(Postavnin) – Today, to us come basically young migrants from villages, they 
absorb, like a sponge, all negative delights of the “urban civilization” and forget 
the beautiful traditions of their country. It is this, and not belonging to the Muslim 
world that irritates others131. 
In his book, he does not mention Wahhabism or extremist Islamists and this is 
exactly the reason his work is included. Analysts, writers and commentators who follow 
a nationalist ideology, usually within the frame of Christianism and Eurocentrism, see 
themselves in a constant war against Islam and immigrants. Due to the lack of knowledge 
or the commitment to an agenda, they fail to understand the real issue and that Muslims, 
also have an enemy which is extremism, and happens to be the same nationalist take as 
the center of their campaigns. With this discourse, nationalists continue to perpetuate the 
stereotype that all non-European or non-Christian immigrants in Russia are Muslims and 
all Muslims pose a danger.  
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Alexandr Kyzmich Ivanov is the founder and leader of the National Party of the 
People (NNPR) and a promoter of Rusizm, an ideology of race supremacy that longs for 
the day all other peoples of Europe, as culturally different as they are, will join Russians 
for the only reason of being "white Europeans"132. Usually, a nationalist and anti-Islam 
discourse is accompanied by elements like pro-Christianity, anti-immigration and 
superiority of the European "white" race, reaffirming the supporters' belief in a clash of 
civilizations. In the NNPR website, there is an interview by The Guardian to Ivanov, but 
the legitimacy of it cannot be proved as there are not archives available online. In this 
interview, Ivanov makes clear his personal and party position on Islam, and like 
Poltoranin, omitting extremists and grouping all Muslims into one group with one 
intention: 
In the future, I am sure a confederation of the White nations of the earth should 
appear, which include the Russian peoples (Belarusians, Ukrainians, Great 
Russians and other Slavs), and they will be obliged to control the Islamic states in 
order to survive together with other European peoples.133  
In another paragraph, he does mention "Islamists" are the enemy, which is a 
correct term that is applied to those who support an ideology of radical fundamentalist 
views to achieve political goals, a position not shared by all Muslims: “We digested them. 
But now a new Bolshevism - Islam. And so, we understand that our primary enemies are 
the Islamists.”134 
Considerable difficulties were encounter gathering additional information on 
nationalist groups or individuals who have a blurry discourse on Wahhabism and Islam 
that may affect the perception of Muslims in Russia. Two searches online were run with 
the same keywords in English and Russian, when entering “nationalist groups against 
Islam” the results showed Pegida, the Stop Islamisation of Europe group (SIOE) and some 
articles by news media in the US reporting of far-right groups rallying against Islam in 
Europe and Australia. When entering the same keywords in Russian, 
“Националистические группы против ислама” (Natsionalisticheskiy gruppy protiv 
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133 Ibid. 
134 Ibid.  
60 
 
islama) the results showed descriptions of what Russian Muslims are, Islamic terrorism, 
Islamic movement in Uzbekistan and the Nation of Islam, as well as one article about 
right wing nationalist in Europe and metal bands that include lyrics anti-Islam in their 
songs in the same way some do against Christianity.  It is important to mention the settings 
on the search engine of the computer used are set to show results among websites in the 
Russian Federation. Since discourse is not only limited to text, and pictures can be 
analyzed too, a second search was ran using the word “Wahhabis” and “Muslims” in 
English and Russian and the results showed that for Wahhabis in Russian, pictures of 
Chechen militias were common and in English, the results show a wider spectrum where 
terrorist groups like the Islamic State are frequent. For “Muslims” in Russian, pictures of 
praying men were dominant but also those that show Muslims as a threat intending to 
dominate the world. In English, the results for “Muslims” were similar. Since there is no 
way to confirm those pictures depicting Muslims as a threat were created by individuals 
or groups with a nationalist ideology, their analysis cannot be deepened.  
In Russia, the main political discourse on Wahhabism and Islam has drawn a line 
that separates both terms from each other, one being considered an extremist movement 
or ideology and as such, is subject to ban or control by the authorities. Discourse by 
politicians relating Wahhabism to Islam is non-existent according to the information 
gathered and presented here. There are Russian academics who contribute with their 
works on Wahhabism to areas like history, politics and specially, security studies. These 
academics do a good job by demonstrating that followers of Wahhabism and Sufi Islam 
do not share the same canonical principles, pursue the same goals or use similar means to 
achieve them. Unfortunately, academic discourse is not very likely to reach out to the 
masses the same way a political or nationalist discourse can.  
A nationalist discourse on Wahhabism and Islam was more difficult to find for 
this research and for two probable reasons: 1) it is the result of article 282 UK RF 
punishing any incitement of hatred towards religion, among others, that demotivates 
individuals or groups from speaking out their ideas, and those who do like 2) the discourse 
that exist by individuals like Alexandr Ivanov and his National Party of the People does 
not differentiate between Islamists or extremists and Muslims, for him, all Muslims are 
extremists according to the discourse analyzed here. There is also a discourse that links 
immigrants to Muslims and could have a bigger impact in the society, especially with 
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what is seen in the European Union and the flood of refugees and migrants from the 
Middle East.  
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CHAPTER 4. RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE ON WAHHABISM 
This chapter will be divided in two sections, the first analyzes the Muslim 
discourse on Wahhabism and the second the Orthodox discourse on Wahhabism and 
Islam. Though information was available from both perspectives, it is necessary to 
mention that there is more information on Muslim discourse on Wahhabism than 
Orthodox. This could be the result of traditional Islam fighting Wahhabism through the 
spread of information by Russian scholars and religious leaders and, hence, Orthodox 
leaders have little participation on this public discourse. The information presented in the 
first section was retrieved from the website Islam Today, elibrary.ru, Islamvera and The 
Spiritual Administration of Muslims of St. Petersburg and the North-West of Russia 
website. Some attempts were made to get the opinion of Ravil Seyfetdinov, 
Plenipotentiary representative of the mufti sheikh Ravil Gainutdin in the North-West 
Federal District, First Deputy Chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of St. 
Petersburg and the Leningrad Region (St. Petersburg Mukhtasibata) but unfortunately, he 
did not provide any answers to the questions given through private message in social 
media. The information on the second section was retrieved from the website Pravoslavie. 
The methodology in this subchapter also included the search online using keywords both 
in English and Russian “Wahhabi, Wahhabism in Russia, Christianity on Wahhabism in 
Russia, Orthodox on Wahhabism”.  
4.1 Muslim Discourse 
This section is disproportionately longer than the second part and this could be as 
the result of Muslim authorities interested in fighting and eliminating extremism in its 
ranks. As we explored in chapter III, there are some academics who have dedicated their 
studies to the analysis of Wahhabism and some of them could be Muslim, which 
contributes to the religious discourse against it from the highest levels in the Islamic 
tradition. Unlike academics, religious men support their discourse through the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, as well as other books like the Hadiths to teach how Wahhabism is a deviation 
of Islam that should be prohibited in the Russian Federation for its extremist canons. It 
would be appropriate to start this analysis with the clergy meeting that took place in 
Grozny in February 2016 and gathered the representatives of Chechnya, Ingushetia and 
Dagestan a resolution against extremism in these three republics was adopted.135 The 
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participation of the Head of the Chechen government Ramzan Kadyrov was relevant as a 
religious man. In this meeting, the discourse of "us vs them" was a constant, like the 
words by Ibrahim Belkhoroev who is a clergy authority of Ingushetia and referred to those 
who in 1991 took part of extremist demonstrations in Chechnya (Wahhabis) as "the 
people who are trying to drive a wedge between our nations, and we will not allow them 
to do this."136. Arbi Habziev, imam of the central Mosque "Heart of Chechnya" in Grozny 
also gave some words on this:  
...Those who are enemies of the Highest, of our prophet and of our statutes are 
enemies of Islam, thereafter our enemies. We should not event sit next to them, 
nor even to glance in their direction. If one of our kind dares to contact such - we 
renounce them.137  
This declaration is relevant because Wahhabis differentiate from Shi'ites in some 
statutes like the worship of the prophet or saints138, leaving no room for doubts on who 
the “enemy” here is. It is also evident the decisiveness of some clergy members to make 
clear the line between radicals and the rest of Muslims in the region and the will of these, 
to fight extremists. R. Kadyrov, as a Muslim leader and the son of ex-Mufti of Chechnya 
Akhmat Kadyrov, gave some declarations that are direct and effusive:  
What were these people (Wahhabis)? At first, they showed themselves as 
generous good-hearted people who would not leave the mosque. As soon as they 
started crowding, immediately began snapping, and then killing. (...) I brought 
him (Chumakov) here. When you say "brought" - he also does not like. I was 
offended at him after his statements that it is not possible to perform dua at the 
tombs of the saints, supposedly this is pointless. I asked him for an explanation. 
Kadyrov referred to the conflicts with imam Khamzat Chumakov and Isa 
Tsechoev139 who have been related to Wahhabism in Ingushetia140. Both imams have 
been accused of having an extremist ideology and spreading it in the region. 
Today in our republic there are people who listen to their speeches, believing that 
this is true. The Chechens never used the expression "Ahlu sunna valma jama'a." 
                                                          
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Radjabov R. A., P. 111 
139 Khamzat Chumakov and Isa Tsechoev are imams of the mosque Ali-Yurt in Nazranovsky, Ingushetia 
140 “Isa Tsechoev” 15 March 2017 // Kavkazkiy Uzel ("Иса Цечоев" // Кавказский Узел) <http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/299102/> (date of retrieval: 18.04.2017) 
64 
 
We follow the sunnah, the tariqa. A person who does not know either the Sharia, 
or the Tariqa, is a vain person. Why am I saying this? You, the descendants of 
Quraysh and the followers of our regulations, are here today, and you have a 
logical question: "Will there be such situation in Chechnya? 
I will reply: "I swear to you, Isa Tsechoev is a demon who is funded by the Muslim 
Brotherhood." And if one of his supporters tries to preach in one of our mosques, 
one time, maybe, he will, but for the second-time, his head will fly off his 
shoulders. 
With the previous statements, we see that not only Kadyrov is a political leader 
but also, he positions himself as a prominent Muslim figure in the region of the Northern 
Caucasus who, using historic references to the armed conflict against radicals in 
Chechnya in the 90’s, promotes zero tolerance to Wahhabism or other extremist current 
of Islam foreign to the region. Moving on to the analysis of the resolution adopted in this 
meeting, it can be divided in the three sections, the first one that is an introduction, body 
and conclusion:141 
In the name of the Merciful and Merciful Allah! 
Praise be to Allah Almighty for the innumerable benefits, among which is that He 
created us, His slaves, Muslims and followers of the Sunnah of the greatest of the 
people - Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). 
Glory be to the Lord of the Worlds, who sent down to our Caucasian land the 
righteous and God-fearing Sufis and Sheikhs, thanks to whose high moral and 
religious principles and deep faith in Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, true 
Islam spread and survived. 
We should always be grateful to our elders and awwiyas for their religious way - 
tarikat Kadariya and Naqshbandiyya, for the spiritual heritage, the blessings of 
which we now have the opportunity to enjoy. 
Our righteous sheiks dedicated their lives to the cause of religion, its reports in 
the purest form. Everything that contradicts the truth of this path is an innovation 
that is inadmissible in Islam. 
                                                          
141 Uspanov, Beslan, Magomed Edilsultanov 
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The Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) left behind 
the Sunnah, which the Muslims should adhere to. And innovations cannot be 
embedded in the basis of Islam and its canons. 
 
The introduction of five main paragraphs gives recognition to God and the 
prophet, complying with some of the basic precepts in Sufism, it then identifies those 
main regions (or actors) that agreed to protect religious principles and faith in their 
traditional form. The fourth paragraph starts to show the direction of the resolution by 
calling any “innovation” contradicting what regional sheikhs proclaimed, inadmissible. 
Wahhabism can be considered an innovation in two senses, first, Wahhabism part of the 
fourth Islamic Hanbali school, that emerged in 855, in contrast with the Hanafi school 
established in 767 that is mainly more popular in this region142 and the second, as 
Wahhabism was imported by jihadi fighters in the 90’s. The firth paragraph continues 
with the rejection of any innovations.  
We Muslims are obliged not only to avoid innovations in religion, but also to resist 
their development. For Islam - a whole religion, not requiring additions or 
changes, is the religion of Allah. 
We, Muslims, followers of the Kadariya and Naqshbandi tariqas, condemn 
terrorism in any of its manifestations, recognize Wahhabism as a terrorist 
movement acting in the pursuit of its ideology directed against the basic laws of 
the Sharia for the purpose of secession of the Muslim community and weakening 
of the unity of Muslims around the world, acting with the name of Allah in the 
name of preserving the true values of Islam and follow the pious Sunnah of the 
Messenger of the Most High (peace and blessings be upon him). 
We affirm that Wahhabism, like other currents, aiming to crush the shipyard of 
Islamic norms and the integrity of the Muslim Ummah, which do not recognize 
the seriousness and compulsion to observe certain important aspects of the 
religious course, including the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah 
be upon him) Welcomes) as part of the Sunnah, are extremist-terrorist in nature 
and cause tangible harm to the Islamic world. 
We, the Murida of Kadariya and Naqshbandiyya of the tarikat, are unanimous in 
the opinion that Wahhabism is dangerous for Muslim society; that in the Russian 
                                                          
142 Radjabov R. A., P. 112 
66 
 
Muslim ummah there is no place for those ideologies that contradict religion and 
the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon 
him), Islam, its foundations and those who truly follow it, target the truth of 
religion, trampling on its values. 
As for individuals or organizations that directly or indirectly sympathize with or 
support Wahhabism and similar trends, we openly declare that we are ready to 
fight against this threat to Islam in every way. 
 
In this section, the body, we see five paragraphs in which four start with “we”, 
two of them with the construction “we Muslims” that reinforces the adopters’ of this 
resolution position against Wahhabis or “the others”. In the first paragraph the word 
“innovation” is repeated and the insistence of rejecting any changes to Islam. The second 
paragraph is clearer to recognize Wahhabism as a terrorist movement, that uses the name 
of God to pursue their objectives and the third paragraph, exposes it as extremist for its 
aim at destroying Islam through the rejection of basic religious principles. The fourth and 
fifth paragraphs demonstrate unity in the Russian Muslim society and its communal 
rejection to any ideology that contradicts or harms Islam, continuing the “us vs them” 
construction. 
 
In connection with the foregoing, we, the followers of the Kadariya and 
Naqshbandi tarikat: 
1. Condemn: 
- terrorism and extremism in the face of Wahhabism; 
- any decision regarding religion and its canons, taken without due consideration 
of prominent Islamic scholars; 
- Any innovations that contradict the basis of religion and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him); 
2. Do not recognize: 
- the actions of the pseudo-Salafist councils (Wahhabis), carrying out its activities 
in any region of the world, in particular in the territory of the Russian Federation, 
which takes any decisions on religion and religious terms, even if this council 
includes at least one pseudo-Salafist; 
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- as well as decisions taken with regard to Islam and Islamic norms by the religious 
council of pseudo-Salafist (organization), we will consider invalid; 
3. Deny: 
- decisions, decisions and general provisions on religious values, religious beliefs, 
Sufism and Tariqa, 
And religion in general, adopted by the religious council of the pseudo-Salafist 
(organization) operating in the world, including the Russian Federation, without 
considering the opinions of scientists, descendants and followers of the Kadariya 
and Naqshbandi tarikat; 
4. Condemn: 
- Representatives of virds who enter the religious council, where members are 
pseudo-Salafist (Wahhabis) or at least one of them, then after the adoption of this 
resolution, he is not from us, and we renounce any of his affairs; 
5. Recognize: 
- only debate and discussions with pseudo-Salafist (Wahhabis), in order to prove 
their erroneous ideology in the Sharia, and to call them to account according to 
Sharia law; 
Based on the above arguments, we, the undersigned, fully support this resolution! 
May Allah strengthen us on the true path! 
The conclusion lists five actions that include the condemnation of decisions 
involving religion and canons that ignore Islamic scholars, representatives who take part 
of councils where some or all members are Wahhabis and the not recognition of Wahhabi 
councils and their decisions. In these five actions, the words "decisions" and "councils" 
are constant and part of the discourse that promotes its denial. Perhaps, to understand this 
strong position against Wahhabis in the region, to the already analyzed history of the two 
Chechen wars, we have to add the perception and knowledge Akhmat Kadyrov had of 
them and that very likely influenced what Ramzan Kadyrov today stands for.  
Mankiev mentions A. Kadyrov had great knowledge of Islam and its history, 
having studied in the madrassa Mir Arab and the Tashkent Islamic Institute, hence “he 
knew very well the danger Wahhabis, their ideology and political goals posed”143 and he 
numbers three goals A. Kadyrov considered Wahhabis had in the region: 
                                                          
143 Mankiev, A. A. P. 272 
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1) rejection of the Northern Caucasus from Russia, 2) the liquidation of the 
Chechen Republic by being absorbed by an Islamic state from sea to sea, they 
intended to create, 3) de-chechenization of Chechens, the deprivation of their 
national – cultural and religious traditions, their Arabization, the way Wahhabis 
understood it.144 
The issue of a Chechen identity was relevant for A. Kadyrov, this is understandable by 
crossing the historic information previously analyzed and see how during the first 
Chechen war the fighting was more motivated by nationalism and the search of a Chechen 
identity after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ideas A. Kadyrov shared with 
Dudayev. He was appointed Mufti of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 1995, and from 
this date up to 1999 when the second conflict started, the fighting had taken a different 
direction thanks to the mujahedeen who came to the region from abroad, stayed and 
intended to establish a Caliphate, situation he noticed as Mankiev proposes, “In every 
possible way, they promoted an Arab lifestyle, invented for Chechens by I. Umarov, M. 
Udugov, Khattab and others. The Taliban Afghanistan was taken as a reference of Islamic 
statehood”145, also “the Heads of Chechen Wahhabis established close contact with 
Usama bin Laden, who generously financed all projects to transform Chechnya into the 
tip of a spear aimed at the heart of Russia”146. But maybe one of A. Kadyrov’s the most 
controversial quotes in Mankiev’s work is “they (Wahhabis) considered (the Chechen 
nation) as cattle, as herd” putting in evidence the supposed religious supremacy Wahhabis 
consider they have over other Muslims who do not adhere to their principles, therefore, 
must be changed. This is directly linked to his thought of ignorance and fanaticism as a 
tool they used to maintain their power over Chechens, “ignorance and fanaticism was 
imposed on our people. Because the ignorant and fanatics are easy to manage”147, words 
that can be seen as an attempt to delegitimize Wahhabism by naming it “ignorance and 
fanaticism” and the relationship between the dominant and the dominated.  
Finally, Mankiev concludes with A. Kadyrov’s description of Wahhabism148 as follows:  
Wahhabism has multi-faces. It is dressed in clothes of “pure Islam”, jihad, 
gazavat, the world Islamic brotherhood. But, in fact Wahhabi “scientist” are 
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political adventurists and religious extremists, a hotbed for international terrorism 
and banditry.  The core of Wahhabism is religious intolerance and the ignorance 
of all national aspects of any nation in favor of an Islamic International. 
With this analysis, we can conclude that A. Kadyrov’s discourse on Wahhabism 
managed to identify the danger it posed in that moment for Chechnya and the neighboring 
republics. His discourse puts the national identity of Chechnya and its’ people’s traditions 
in the center of his defense, and this has been kept and reproduced by the current Head of 
government R. Kadyrov.  
Another figure to take into consideration in the discourse against Wahhabism is 
the role of Sheikh mufti Zhafar Ponchaev. who was the chairman of the organization 
Spiritual Board of Muslims of St. Petersburg and North-Western region of Russia and 
mufti of St. Petersburg Cathedral Mosque until his death, among other positions, 
according to information from the Spiritual Board of Muslims of St. Petersburg and 
North-Western region of Russia website he "led an irreconcilable and principled struggle 
against the reactionary current "Wahhabism" and its followers. He repeatedly conducted 
mass events, explaining the perniciousness and fallacy of the theory of Wahhabism.”149. 
Unfortunately, his speech against Wahhabism and its followers was not available online 
but that does not invalid his inclusion in this study as his position according to one of the 
organizations he presided, was of antagonism to Wahhabism. The current Mufti of Saint-
Petersburg Ravil Pancheev when asked about the explosion in the metro of Saint-
Petersburg in April 2017, and how the suicide attacker had links to extremist groups 
through recruiters he answered:  
The recruiters do not go to the Mosque. We are their competition and enemies. 
Just remember, how many imams and muftis have been killed in the fight against 
Wahhabis. We cannot know them all. We do not have a network of agents. We 
are not a punitive body and cannot reach out to every street, house or basement. 
Here it is necessary a comprehensive work with law enforcement agencies.150 
                                                          
149 Mufti Ponchaev Zh. N. // The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of St. Petersburg and the North-West of Russia 
(Муфтий Пончаев Ж.Н. // Духовное управление мусульман Санкт-Петербурга и Северо-Западного региона 
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150 Oleksyuk, Ivan. "St. Petersburg mufti about the" bearded "from the metro Ilyas Nikitin: What he wanted, he also 
found" // Komsomolskaya Pravda. (Олексюк, Иван. "Муфтий Петербурга о «бородаче» из метро Ильясе 
Никитине: Что хотел, то и нашел" // Комсомольская Правда) <http://www.spb.kp.ru/daily/26664.7/3685159/> 
(date of retrieval 22.04.17) 
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In this declaration, it is possible to see many similarities to the resolution adopted 
in February 2016 in Grozny with the repetition of “we” several times. This construction 
and style only reinforces the attempts to differentiate followers of traditional Islam from 
Wahhabis. Though, the words by Mufti Pancheev are not as sharp as those by R. Kadyrov, 
he does create a cloud of negativity around Wahhabis by labeling them as the “enemy” 
and “competition” as well as using an indirect wording to “murderers” by saying “how 
many imams and muftis have been killed in the fight against Wahhabis”. Three of the 
seven sentences in this paragraph state how they (the Muslim traditional authorities) 
cannot do much the fight against extremism and Wahhabism, therefore, cooperation with 
the government is necessary. This proves that, the previously analyzed relationship 
between Muslim leaders and politicians does not represent the Islamization of Russian 
politics but rather a closer cooperation that benefits both sides as, preventing extremism 
and radicalization of Muslims is crucial in fighting discrimination against the entire 
Muslim population and for the State, in preventing the growth of far-right nationalist 
movements that promote ethnocentrism.  
Mufti of Moscow, Albir Krganov, has written about Wahhabism in his work 
"Some misconceptions of Wahhabis - the history of emergence"151, unfortunately, this 
material was not available online as any other declarations similar to those by Mufti 
Pancheev. Though he has not made any considerable statement on Wahhabism, Mufti of 
Tatarstan, Kamil Samigullin made clear his position towards Islamists, in 2013: 
We will never dialogue with those, who advocate terrorism, we will not dialogue 
with them...my task is to unite Muslims and develop science. In our library, there 
are books on all sciences. We can solve any question with a cup of tea152. 
The lack of a tougher and more precise position against Wahhabism in Tatarstan 
could be criticized as there have been reports of a “Wahhabization” of Tatarstan in the 
last years.153 In this short sentence, Samigullin presents two different contradicting ideas, 
the second deviates the attention on the first. In the first sentence, he follows the same 
construction seen in other discourses analyzed here, “we” and “them”, with the difference 
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that he does not mention Wahhabis but “those, who advocate terrorism”. In the 
construction “to unite Muslims and develop science”, the message should be seen as 
uniting those two parts he addressed first, “we” and “them” as he probably perceives the 
other, as lost in their faith and through science (the proper study of Islam and Russian 
Muslim academics) they can “get back on track”. The last sentence, “we can solve any 
question with a cup of tea”, gives the impression he is open to dialogue to educate those 
who are willing to be educated, which can mark the difference between terrorist (not 
entitled to dialogue) and radicals (who can still be changed).  
In August 2016 took place the World Conference of Muslim Scientists in Grozny 
and mufti of Chechnya, Salakh Mezhiev commented to some Russian media about the 
religious order achieved in the conference where Wahhabism was one of the topics:  
We adopted a fatwa (religious order) and final resolution, as well as an appeal to 
Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin that on the basis of these 
documents and our common consent Wahhabis were recognized as sectarians and 
banned at the legislative level.154 
This declaration follows the same discourse used in the resolution adopted in the 
clergy meeting in Grozny in February that year in which Wahhabism is referred to as a 
“current, ideology, terrorist movement”.  Hence, based on the definition of extremism 
provided in the Federal law to Counter extremist activities in article 1, one of the 
characteristics of extremism is the public justification of terrorism and other terrorist 
activities155, like Wahhabis do according to the declarations of some religious leaders and 
scholars and so it should be banned. Additionally, in an attempt at de-attaching the 
concept of jihad from a negative perception in the media, that relates it to terrorist 
activities of Wahhabis, mufti Mezhiev mentioned to Interfax: 
I would urge all of them (the media) not to do it, because otherwise, firstly, we 
recognize that these people are on the path of true jihad, and this is not so. 
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Secondly, jihad is a means to an end, and our goal is to adhere to the norms of 
Islam. So, these people should be called "Shaytans" (demons).156 
This is a constant topic of discussion among Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
West as confusion created especially by the media in using the word jihad as a reference 
to an “Islamic Holy war” gave it a negative meaning.157 Bakker’s definition of jihad has 
been explored in chapter I, additionally Nurutdinov also stresses equaling jihad and 
terrorism does not lead to dialogue, as they are unrelated.158  
Moving on to the analysis of discourse on Wahhabism in websites of Muslim 
organisms and groups, we see in the website of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims 
of Tatarstan, Wahhabism is described as a "Muslim Protestantism", where the author also 
addresses the necessity of recognizing Sufism as the alternative to stopping the spread of 
Wahhabism in Russia159. It is relevant to notice the comparison with Protestantism as it 
started as a movement in the Catholic Church that sought to make drastic changes to 
ecclesiological structures and theological principles but ended up breaking from it.160 
Because Protestants considered the Catholic Church had deviated from Biblical teachings 
and fallen into corruption, example of this is the selling of indulgencies that benefitted 
the wealthy, they can be considered a radical current in Christianity in the sense it 
intended to go back to Biblical roots.161 This comparison is inaccurate and should be done 
carefully as, Protestantism emerged in response to corruption practices in the Catholic 
Church and today, is one of the major religions in countries like Germany and the United 
States, and state religion in others like Norway. These countries have high levels of 
human development and functioning economies; therefore, this comparison would give 
Wahhabis the tools to legitimize their ideology portraying it as a path to development. 
The website “Islamvera” has a more detailed description of Wahhabis stating:  
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A Wahhabi is a member of the Wahhabi sect with a known conviction, that Allah 
has physical attributes, as well as other deviations from the truth. They, for 
example, claim that Allah is a body (let the Almighty save us from such a 
delusion!), that our Creator has hands, feet and sits in the Throne. They interpret 
the verses of the Quran in their own way, ignoring the interpretations of the 
greatest scientists. And many non-Muslims, deciding that Wahhabism is an 
Islamic dogma, turn away from Islam.162 
Breaking this definition in three parts makes clearer the intentions of the author. 
The first two sentences put in a simple way the believes Wahhabis worship, according to 
the author, here also is visible the intention to make a mockery of it by stating it is a 
“delusion!”. The third sentence is more moderate than the first two in its language and 
coincides with the resolution adopted in the clergy meeting in Grozny in February 2016, 
where it is stated they (the clergy) will deny any decisions made by Wahhabis "without 
considering the opinions of scientists, descendants and followers of the Kadariya and 
Naqshbandi tarikat" and condemn "any decision regarding religion and its canons, taken 
without due consideration of prominent Islamic scholars”, reinforcing the fact Wahhabis 
in the pursue of their own interpretation of the verses, ignore scholars and scientist. The 
third sentence is a very simple explanatory assertion that Wahhabism is not part of Islam. 
As a conclusion, we can say this definition is targeted at non-Muslims or recent coverts 
because of its simple language that tries to delegitimize Wahhabism.  
The same discourse continues in other descriptions of Wahhabis in this website 
with phrases like "the main strategy of Wahhabis is to present their delusions as a true 
Islamic faith, like those who sell wine grape juice disguised as wine.”163 And to the 
precept of the materialization of God following a literal interpretation of the verses, it 
states: 
It is the assimilation of Allah to objects (claiming Allah has hands). Sometimes 
they add: “this hand, is worthy of His greatness”, or: “He has a hand, but how is 
it: big or small, what color or how it looks like, we don´t know”. This is stupid. If 
you say: “He has a hand”, this is already an assimilation.164 
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This paragraph not only exposes one of the differences in the interpretation 
Wahhabis and Sufis give to the verses but it also is explicit in what the author thinks of 
the Wahhabi believe. The website “Islam Today” describes Wahhabism as a “radical 
religious – political movement” with five basic dogmas:  
(1)Strict adherence to tawhid - unconditional faith in one God, which they 
represent in anthropomorphic form (in the form of a creature occupying space in 
space, having organs and parts of the body), (2)complete denial of any innovation 
in religion, (3)criticism of collective taklid - following a single madhhab (School 
of recognized, traditional theologians who explain the Quran and the Sunna), 
(4)understanding of the Salaf in the interpretation of the names of the Almighty 
and (5)all Muslims who do not share their beliefs, Wahhabis consider stray.165 
The first dogma proposed in this website reinforces the definition of Wahhabi in 
“Islamvera” that includes physical attributes to God. Denial of innovations and the 
ignorance of scientists or scholars, experts in Islam are a constant element here that is 
present in other pieces of speeches, definitions and resolutions analyzed in this work. In 
this definition, in contrast with the one in Islamvera, the believe of Wahhabis that all those 
who do not align with their ideology, are wrong.  
This subchapter can be summarized by concluding that among the Muslim 
population in Russia, it is well-known what Wahhabism and its followers are thanks to 
the work of religious leaders, scholars and scientists. Wahhabism is considered an 
ideology, deviation or current of Islam that is based on dogmas that contradict Sufism and 
the traditional religious schools. They give a literal interpretation to the verses in the 
Quran and the Sunna, and do not recognize the knowledge of Muslim scholars and 
scientists, which may portray them as unwise and together with their opposition to 
innovations in religion, makes the perfect combination to be considered radicals. 
According to Muslim religious leaders, it is this radicalism that leads to extremism as 
they think of those who do not follow their dogmas as sinners or infidels.  
4. 2 Orthodox Christian Discourse 
The information available on Orthodox Christian discourse on Wahhabism was 
very limited. Only one source of information can be considered reliable, hence it is 
                                                          
165 Wahhabism in the Islamic world (Ваххабизм в Исламском мире) // Islam Today. URL: http://islam-
today.ru/radical-movements/ (date of retrieval: 01.05.2017)  
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included in the analysis, the author and creator of the website “Pravoslavie”, Alexandr 
Apadshakhov, has written an article displayed on the section "Analysis of global 
problems", titled "Wahhabis - Jihad against Russia". As an introduction, Apadshakhov 
considers Wahhabism is a current of Islam that is coordinated with the West to achieve 
the final goal of converting all the Post-Soviet space population to Islam and at the same 
time, reduce it to 20 - 30 million. He includes some descriptions on the similarities 
between Orthodox Christians and Wahhabis, perceived by the first and traditional 
Muslims.  
"Orthodox Christians who have met with "Wahhabis" always notice certain 
customs, outwardly similar to Christian, distinguishing "Wahhabis" from 
traditional Muslims. This is also noticed by traditional Muslims, who often take 
Orthodox for "Wahhabis" in their homes. So, one Caucasian Muslim 
traditionalist, having heard that Orthodox greet each other by touching their right 
cheeks, that Orthodox priests wear long hair, and that it is considered unbecoming 
for Orthodox Christians to play cards, smoke, etc." 166 
It is possible to observe some of these similarities in other even more conservative 
religious denominations outside of Russia that, in an attempt to “go back on track” to the 
origin of their creed, look into the "roots" of it to find a purer interpretation of their beliefs. 
Some of these may fall into extremism, intolerance or a perceived superiority towards 
other religious and non-religious people, example of this can be the Faithful World 
Baptist Church in and the Westboro Baptist Church whose leaders openly speak against 
sexual minorities and other religious groups like Catholics, Muslims and Orthodox 
Christians. On a local and more recent case, the Supreme court’s decision to declare 
Jehovah Witnesses an extremist organization and forbid their practices and activities in 
Russia came as a response to fighting extremism, as according to the words of experts 
from the legal center for the protection of human rights and dignity of the individual of 
the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religion and Sects (RATSIRS),167 
“the Methods of suppression of people's will (by Jehovah Witnesses), overt mental 
                                                          
166 Apadshakhov, Alexandr. Wahhabis - Jihad against Russia. Analysis of Global Problems. (Ападшaхов, 
Александр. Ваххабиты - джихад против России. Анализ глобальных проблем) // Pravoslavie. URL: 
http://www.pravoslavie.ru/analit/global/vah.htm (date of retrieval 08.05.2017) 
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retrieval 08.05.2017)  
76 
 
manipulation, are similar to those used in openly terrorist organizations.”168 This 
resolution may also come as a response to the Strategy of National Security of the Russian 
Federation of 2015 in its task of protecting the Russian people from foreign religious 
intolerance groups (subchapter 1.3.1).  
Apadshakhov’s article is divided into six sections, each of them provide an 
analysis of Wahhabism in Russia through a historical approach, highlighting a military 
preparation more characteristic of the mujahedeen. On the first section, “Wahhabi 
dogmatic” he describes very superficially some of the precepts of Wahhabism like 
monotheism and the belief in Sharia. The second section “The standard scheme of their 
actions”, he offers an approach to understanding how Wahhabis work their strategy to 
gain adepts stating first that they will "gradually seize territory with simultaneous 
separation of small parts in different places". In the third section, “Who created the 
Wahhabis” it is crucial to notice Adapshakhov’s version of a conspiracy between some 
Middle Eastern governments and the West, specifically England, to destabilize the Soviet 
Union through the use of the Muslim factor in the 70's, similar to Popenkov's thesis 
analyzed in chapter III.  
The most widespread non-communist force of the Soviet empire was Islam. It was 
decided the control of the post-Soviet reality was possible through a controlled 
Islamization. After that, experts developed a programme for the movement of 
international fundamentalism to the Middle East, the territory of the USSR 
satellites, the Balkans and the Soviet Union itself. The main requirements for the 
new movement were manageability, ease of distribution and self-financing. For 
several years, the group together with representatives of the Arab elites developed 
the program.169 
He suggests in the fourth section, "Training course - where and how are these 
Wahhabis made" Wahhabi recruiters will be discreet with propaganda and give financial 
support Islamic organizations, create a network of supporters with this economic impulse 
and studies abroad (on Wahhabi camps or Jamaats). He gives special dedication to the 
                                                          
168 Sectologists called the ban on "Jehovah's Witnesses" an act of justice and humanity (Сектоведы назвали запрет 
"Свидетелей Иеговы" актом справедливости и гуманности) // Interfax. April 24, 2017. URL: 
http://www.interfax.ru/russia/559742 (date of retrieval 08.05.2017) 
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description of these camps, as on his view, military training in Jamaats is the means that 
will help Wahhabis win the battle against government forces (Russian) sometimes, with 
the assistance of NATO. By excessively focusing on the description of "jamaats", the 
author excludes all other canonic and sociopolitical aspects of Wahhabism. He does not 
specify not all Wahhabis receive camp training, hence for him, all Wahhabis are trained 
in Afghanistan, Algeria, Libya, Lebanon and other countries. Fifth and six sections, 
"Recruitment" and "From rookie to emir - training", Apadshakhov stresses all the levels 
of "academic" preparation of what he considers, is the path all Wahhabis go through. He 
mentions the Islamic Institute "Kavkaz" in Serzhen-Yurt as one of the locations this 
education starts. His conclusion is not very clear as he relates Wahhabism with the 
Islamization of the country, and how it could release terrible consequences for Orthodox 
Christians:  
For so many residents of Russia, completely indifferent to the Faith, 
"Wahhabism", oddly enough, may seem a boon - a substitute for the "order" that 
was under the Communists. But for Orthodox Christians, the very real prospect 
of Islamization of Russia can only mean new monstrous persecution.170 
Apadshakhov’s analysis is limited to the explanation of only one part of 
Wahhabism, in the world not in Russia, which is the military training some warlords 
receive and the process of educating recruits into the ideology. If Apadshakhov’s 
intention is to inform Orthodox Christians what Wahhabism is, it would serve him well 
to provide a more exhausting analysis of the canonic differences between Wahhabis and 
followers of traditional Islam in Russia, focus his analysis in the Russian context and 
broaden his comments on the target of Wahhabis, who are not only the Russian security 
forces or religious groups but also other Muslims who are also fighting against the spread 
of this extremist ideology.  
Wahhabism is a constant part of the discourse in clergy meetings in the republics 
of the Northern Caucasus with Chechen religious leaders at the top of the discussions, 
this probably thanks to the unfortunate events of the 90’s to which they were the first 
front, hence gained experience and knowledge of it before other regions. Despite news 
reports of a growing Islamic radicalism in Tatarstan, prominent Muslim leaders in the 
region have not made considerable public declarations on the topic. In other cities, outside 
                                                          
170 Ibid.  
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of Muslim majority republics, Muslim leaders are well aware of what Wahhabism is and 
the dangers it may pose to the Muslim community and take measures to counter-balance 
their expansion and influence. There is a lack of information on Wahhabism by Orthodox 
Christian sources as during this research no declaration by prominent religious leaders 
was found. This could be positive as it will not contribute to religious conflicts by giving 
inaccurate information on the other side, without completely understanding their canons, 
structure and problems. It can also be negative as some Orthodox Christians may only 
listen to the media’s discourse on Islamic radicalism, put all Muslims into that label and 
themselves into the identity of Christianity in conflict with Islam, something Orthodox 
leaders could prevent. 
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CONCLUSION 
As seen throughout this analysis, three out of the five sectors of the Russian 
society with access to spreading their discourse and shape reality do not consider or relate 
Wahhabism to Islam, of the other two, one has limited possibilities thanks to the existent 
legislation to protect the multinational and multi-religious composition of the State and 
against extremism and the other, lacks any reference to Wahhabism and Islam probably 
as the lack of knowledge on either concept and not to interfere in issues that may cause 
inter-religious conflicts. Discourse not only serves the function of communicating people 
on their basic needs as part of society, but it also shapes reality around us in an always 
evolving cycle that creates new understanding and ways to see life and human 
interactions. What we express, and what we omit, through text, pictures, and behavior 
delivers a message to the others, and depending on our intentions can bring closer or get 
farther individuals to make them part of our group or push them away to be the antithesis 
of ourselves. This contributes to the emergence of labels or stereotypes of those who were 
pushed, shaping the perception we have of them (the other). This relation was explored 
and demonstrated with considerable sufficient academic material that supports the idea 
of discourse as the source of every perception constructed by society. Perception leads to 
profiling, as in the process of identity formation, once the dominant group who pushed 
away the undesired individuals, has completed their self-identification they will reinforce 
the known and unwanted attributes of the dominated and use them to single them out in 
a crowd. This is where the importance of discourse lies in the process of profiling, as in 
order to improve this technique in security practices, it is necessary to understand that 
some of the socially constructed attributes of the profiled, might be inaccurate as they 
respond to the perception the dominant have of the dominated. These socially constructed 
attributes may be exaggerations of reality as the result of the process of identity formation.  
As explored in chapter I, media has the most important role in disseminating the 
socially constructed perception or profile the dominant want on the dominated thanks to 
the access they have to propagate their discourse. The intentions could be many but since 
the relation between discourse and power is crucial for those who use it as a tool of change 
or continuity, it is evident that using discourse to profile the dominated can help boost the 
identity of the dominant and get support from those he or she see as equals and who 
perceive themselves as part of that group. As discourse is the result of social 
legitimization of understanding and knowledge, it gives new meanings to the known 
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reality that can be used for policy making. When the dominant understands and takes 
advantage of this, an ideology is born, that can be consecrated if the dominant hold or 
gain political power.  
The previous knowledge can be useful in understanding the presidential 
campaigns in the United States in 2016, and France and the Netherlands in 2017, where 
in all, the immigrant and Muslim population were a target of the anti-system dominant 
candidates with political power. Discourses by Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Geert 
Wilders contained elements of identity formation and profiling of the other based on 
primitive physical and non-physical attributes socially constructed through the perception 
of immigrants and Muslims in the American, Dutch and French collective memory. The 
theory of extremization through discourse can be implemented in the analysis of the rise 
of nationalism or the far-left in the United States in this same period, as the words current 
president Trump would give in his rallies, pushed "undesired" individuals out of his and 
his supporters' utopian society forcing them into hiding or join a counter-movement of 
resistance. With presidential election in Russia in 2018 it is yet to be seen if the group 
identity formation formula used by the anti-system candidates in France, the Netherlands 
and the U.S. will be replicated, if so, it will be worth of analysis how successful it will be 
among all groups of the society in Russia and how much acceptance or rejection it will 
have among the ethnic majority groups.  
Without knowledge of the social composition of the Russian population and the 
role Muslims of all origins play in it even in the highest political spheres, and the proper 
analysis of the references to them in public political, academic and religious discourses, 
non-Russian analysts would fall for the reality presented in the American, Dutch and 
French scenarios previously exposed. Not only this, but also knowledge on the existence 
of legal tools and an active fight against extremism from all types and denominations, can 
provide early signs of the success this discourse can possibly have as studied in chapter 
I, there are limitations to public expression of messages that promote superiority of ethnic 
or religious groups. The intention of these laws should not only be seen as to protect a 
socially responsible freedom of speech by limiting offenses or attacks on other individuals 
or groups but aimed at protecting a moderate speech and peaceful coexistence without 
the intervention of foreign actors or models of policy making where a underregulated 
speech can result in hate speech, physical and verbal attacks, extremization, radicalization 
and violent crimes with bloody outcomes. Additionally, we should not ignore the 
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possibility of some actors using these legal frameworks on their favor to censor a speech 
or discourse that is not positive to their interests, nevertheless, since this was not the 
direction of this research, it was not included here. This legal framework has 
demonstrated its applicability in fighting extremism in Russia with the recent outlaw of 
the Jehovah Witnesses’ activities, criticized by Western governments but that complies 
with the Russian law and accepted definition of extremism and extremist organizations 
and activities, which on the same basis, Muslim leaders have asked the Russian authorities 
outlaw Wahhabism. 
The Russian Federation, as an multinational and multi-confessional state, is 
composed of over 200 national groups whose major religions are considered to be 
Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and Orthodox Christianity, among others, including non-
religious affiliations. It is because of this that the legal framework in the Federal 
Constitution and other documents part of this analysis are important in dictating how a 
good relation between so many different groups could maintain peace. In regard to this, 
and because of the constructed idea of Islam being an enemy of Western civilization, 
characterized by Christian European values, that its understanding takes higher relevance. 
With this not only we understand that in Russia unlike countries like France, the 
Netherlands or the U.S., it is not usual to find politicians or religious leaders of other 
denominations openly attacking Islam or its adepts, but we can also understand the 
relation between Russia and Muslim majority countries in the Middle East. Definitely, 
geopolitical and economic factors play a huge part in the relationship between every state 
but also the perception of having a shared identity plays an important role in the closeness 
of states in the Middle East have towards Moscow. As seen throughout the chapters, the 
Northern Caucasus and Tatarstan are regions of Muslim majority with institutes educating 
religious leaders, providing learning of the Arab language and organizing pilgrimage to 
Mecca every year. In some Middle Eastern states where the division between religion and 
the state is still thin, this has created the conditions to position Russia as a positive partner 
to cooperate in fighting extremism and Islamic radicalism, like it is done at home. This 
cooperation is very likely to continue and strengthen, if the official discourse on Islam in 
Russia does not change, as other states who claim are also fighting extremist Islamist 
groups in the region, but continue to profile and suspect every Muslim as an imminent 
danger to their national security. Example of this was seen with the travel ban imposed 
by the government of the U.S. in early 2017 and that undermined trust from Muslim 
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majority countries towards that government and may have pushed moderate Muslims to 
a more extremist and defensive attitude towards the “American other”, supporting the 
proposition of extremization through discourse.  
We can say that, it is the lack of a discourse that relates Islam to Wahhabism and 
generalizes Muslims as “the enemy” who pose a danger to Russia and the decisiveness in 
the official discourse Russia in fighting international terrorism given by the president, 
that attracts countries in the Middle East to a partnership with Moscow. This could have 
been one of the directrices the Syrian government considered when welcomed the Russian 
military in 2015 to help fighting Islamist groups like Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (previously 
known as al-Nusra) or the so-called Islamic State. Back to Russia, with constant messages 
on mass media portraying terrorist attacks in European cities, and the explosion in Saint-
Petersburg subway in April 2017, the threat of international terrorism seems to be higher 
than what it actually is, but focusing merely on the public’s reaction we did see a case of 
profiling where the socially constructed attributes of what the dominated have been taught 
to believe a terrorist looks like was present. Ilyas Nikitin was profiled as the responsible 
of the explosion as situationally he was riding the metro at the time of the events, and the 
constructed physical attributes of an Islamist extremist present in the Russian collective 
memory made him an easy target. Of all other men, Nikitin was singled out, supporting 
the proposition in this research that through perception and profiling, the dominant will 
start pushing out individuals they do not identify with, with a possible result of the 
individuals pushed out taking extreme positions to protect from those who rejected them. 
This case also demonstrated how perception and profiling are outdated methods in 
security issues and more energy and resources should be put on prevention and 
identification of extremist individuals and groups online and working in cooperation with 
risk populations. But, can we say the case of Nikitin is the result of a discourse in Russia 
that relates Islam and Muslims to Islamist extremist? From the information found and 
presented here, it is hard to demonstrate the discourse in Russia that speaks of Islam or 
Muslims is responsible for this socially constructed relation since interviews or 
qualitative analysis of the dominated Russians was not part of this research. It would be 
worth of analysis of how Western discourse on Islam and Muslims has influenced the 
perception and profiling of these among the Russian population.  
The information presented in chapter II helps us understand the previous 
interrogation before taking the initiative to do research on Western discourse on Islam 
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and Muslims and its influence on Russians. The 90's was a decade of change in every 
aspect after the Soviet Union disintegrated and the origin of almost every interethnic 
conflict in the Post-Soviet space can be tracked back to that moment. The case of 
Chechnya is not the exception, though this conflict did not start out of interethnic 
differences, but rather as part of the independent movement and evolved into a interethnic 
and inter-confessional conflict throughout the years that the two wars lasted. During this 
period of time, Islamist groups carried out attacks against civilians in the region of the 
Northern Caucasus and other cities in Russia, especially Moscow and because of their 
own interpretation of the scriptures, part of the Wahhabi current, they presented 
themselves with the physical attributes of the group they considered they belong to, long 
beards and traditional religious clothes as a marker. With this, can we say those extremist 
Islamist groups are responsible for the perception and profiling of Islam and Muslims in 
Russia today? The information gathered in this research suggests extremist Islamist 
groups that were active in Russia in the 90's, through their actions, may be a factor that 
in today's Russians collective memory, Muslims from the Northern Caucasus or those 
who share the installed physical attributes mentioned before, should be subjected to 
profiling as they perceive them as threat. Nonetheless, since this study focused 
specifically on the perception of the dominant because of their capacity to shape the 
perception of the dominated through discourse, in a vertical manner, more research is 
needed to understand if the dominated is actually influenced by the perception of the 
dominant and their discourse in Russia on this topic.  
The result of a Western military and political discourse against Muslims 
contributes to the continuous extremization of individuals by sending the message that 
they are not desired. Extremist Islamist groups will take advantage of this and with the 
use of propaganda as sophisticated as that of the West, capitalize feelings of anger against 
the Western aggressor that is bombing Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians, etc. This discourse on 
Islam seems to have been ignored in the West where the media, politicians and some 
religious leaders continue to publicly relate Islam and Muslims to extremist Islamist 
groups. Adding points to that anger that will eventually transform into violent actions 
with bloody results. The Russian government has had a different approach to fighting 
international terrorism, understanding better that what is done abroad will have 
repercussions inside. Additionally, Russia has had a longer relation with Islam than many 
Western European states or the U.S. which has provided a better understanding on the 
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possible conflicts. To this matter, we can also say that the republics of the Northern 
Caucasus with a Muslim majority and Tatarstan have been major players in the 
relationship between Russia and the Middle East. With their own governments, traditions, 
culture and language, yet part of the Federation, their status has also contributed to 
creating legal framework that regulates extremism and profiling of Islam or Muslims in 
the country. Chapter III puts into evidence the identification of Wahhabism as the 
problem that according to politicians, is a threat for international peace and stability and 
for the unity of the Russian Federation and its people. In two out of the three groups 
analyzed in this chapter the relation of Wahhabism to international terrorism and national 
criminal activities is frequent. Academics were the group with the largest amount 
information on Wahhabism, demonstrating that work has been done on studying and 
understanding the real threat for the Russian government stability and the peace of the 
population. It would be interesting to compare the amount of work on Wahhabism carried 
out by academics in Western countries where Islam as a unique and homogeneous entity 
is blamed for the actions of individuals following this extremist Islamist ideology. The 
third group, nationalists, had very little information available opposed to what was 
originally thought during the conception of this research. After having analyzed the 
different legal frameworks, it was understandable why this nationalist discourse was 
almost inexistent online or print. Nevertheless, it is relevant to stress the fact that one site 
with information on Islam through a nationalist group´s perspective was available but 
because the site is not hosted in a Russian domain but rather in a Soviet one. Also, 
offensive pictures can be found in search engines and Russian social media accounts 
where Muslims are related to terrorism, but since it was not possible to identify whether 
the creators belong to a nationalist group or identify as such, this cannot lead to conclusive 
results. Here we can propose two conclusions: 1) academic discourse on Wahhabism is 
very well developed and with sufficient information to help understand the difference 
between traditional Islam and this extremist Islamist ideology, 2) the existent legal 
framework has created the conditions for a responsible public discourse on Islam and 
Muslims where their beliefs are respected and the fight against a wrong perception of this 
religion and its followers is considered of interest for the authorities.  
Nonetheless, the first frontline in the fight against Wahhabism and terrorist 
activities it promotes in the region is among Muslims themselves, the clergy meetings 
and Muslim scientists’ conferences that take place in the country are evidence of this. The 
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fight against extremism and terrorism are usually a central part of these meetings, that 
together with the activities Muftis are involved to talk to the youth about the dangers and 
falseness Wahhabi recruits tell to lure them into their groups. Also, imams have been 
murdered by followers of Wahhabism in Chechnya and Tatarstan for their activities 
against them. It is evident the efforts done by Muslim leaders to de-attach what 
Wahhabism is from Islam, unfortunately, this discourse may not reach non-Muslim 
audiences. Orthodox Christian sources on Wahhabism were scarce, hence little 
information can be given on their perspective on this issue, but the only available source 
was focused on the description of Wahhabis military preparation and no mention of the 
difference between them and followers of traditional Islam, which could create confusion 
among Orthodox Christians and contribute to the profiling of all Muslims. Focusing on 
this lack of information by Orthodox Christian sources, we can say that what is omitted 
contributes to the eternalization of misunderstanding but abiding by the Russian law and 
to avoid any interfaith conflict, out of misinterpretation of canons, it is understandable 
why this discourse is scarce.  
With this information, it is clear that Muslims who follow the considered 
traditional Islam in Russia, are an ally in preventing and fighting extremist groups as they 
know better how to identify them by their canons, customs and traditions, sometimes 
contrasting the capacity of government agencies or non-Muslim Russians who would fall 
for profiling all Muslims depending on the discourse they have been exposed to. This 
gives a broad perspective of the fight against Islamist extremism and international 
terrorism in Russia for researchers abroad, clearing preconceived and socially constructed 
ideas of Russia being an entirely Christian Orthodox state that is in direct conflict with 
Islam, adding more criticism to Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory as Orthodox 
Christians and Muslims do coexist and their leaders respect each other recognizing they 
have a common ground on issues like family and traditional values. This also sheds a light 
on the issue that bringing Muslim leaders closer to government officials and institutions 
could help facilitate the fight against international terrorism in the European Union and 
the United States without meaning a process of Islamization of politics is underway. 
Taking into account that all states have different history and values, what works in Russia 
may not work in other state but it is worth the analysis of the strategy implemented by the 
authorities once Wahhabism was identified as a danger to the stability of the federation 
after the first Chechen war. This strategy is not the result of one specific event but of a 
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series of events in over twenty years that evolved according to the national and 
international necessities. It is not accurate to grade the strategy as perfect or imperfect but 
to judge the conditions of security in Russia in the same period of time and see how major 
terrorist attacks decreased in contrast with Western European states or the U.S. where the 
population was victim of international terrorism more often, committed by extremist 
Islamists. Correlation does not mean causation but in Western European countries like 
France and the Netherlands, as well as in the U.S. it is not unusual to have a politicians, 
academics and other religious leaders’ discourse relating extremist Islamists to Islam and 
Muslims, definitely a comparative analysis that needs special attention. The five 
approaches to how discourse on Wahhabism in Russia contributes to profiling of Islam 
analyzed, prove that three of these discourses in Russia does not contribute to this 
profiling and the two approaches that would be believed to do so, are almost non-existent 
due to the legal framework to fight discrimination and extremism. This does not mean 
there is not such profiling in Russia, but since this only covered a vertical study of 
discourse focusing on those on the top of the structure, it will be necessary to do more 
research covering those at the bottom to understand what discourse is shaping their 
perception of Islam that contributes to profiling of Muslims.  
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